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ABSTRACT 
Efficacious and consistent enforcement of food safety legislation is a 
cornerstone in protecting public health and preventing distorted competition 
between food business operators (FBOs). In case of non-compliance, food 
control authorities must provide the FBO with advice and requests to ensure 
that the FBO corrects the violation. If these actions do not induce compliance 
or the operations cause a health hazard, food control authorities are to employ 
stricter enforcement measures such as orders or prohibitions. Previous studies 
have revealed shortcomings in the use of enforcement measures, highlighting 
the need to investigate factors affecting their use. Moreover, understanding 
how FBOs perceive control actions is important for developing food control 
and promoting trust and positive perceptions of the quality and justness of 
control, thus improving food safety. 
 
This thesis explores the risk-basis, efficacy and consistency of using 
administrative enforcement measures in local official food control in Finland. 
In addition, the importance and uniformity of local official food control are 
investigated from the perspective of FBOs in approved dairy, fishery and meat 
establishments. The methods include analysis of administrative enforcement 
decisions and inspection reports made by local authorities, survey and 
interview of local food control officials and survey of FBOs in approved dairy, 
fishery and meat establishments under local official food control. 
 
Administrative enforcement measures are important control actions 
undertaken to force FBOs to correct multiple, recurrent or critical food safety 
violations. Food control officials have a risk-based approach to enforcement; 
the administrative enforcement process is initiated more rapidly and the 
duration of the process is shorter in critical than in non-critical food safety 
violations. The control actions are gradual, most often starting with a request 
and progressing to administrative enforcement measures in cases of non-
compliance. 
 
The use of administrative enforcement measures induces correction of non-
compliances. However, local food control officials perceive the process as 
laborious and slow. The use of administrative enforcement measures is often 
preceded with repeated requests to correct non-compliances, and the duration 
of enforcement processes is often rather long. Recurrence of violations reveal 
recklessness of some FBOs towards food safety and deficiencies in the efficacy 
of enforcement.  
 
The use of administrative enforcement measures varies among and within the 
local food control units. Some units have a strong routine and practical tools 
 
 
available for using the measures, while others use them rarely or not at all. 
Unclear alignments and uncertainty in using administrative enforcement 
measures decrease the efficacy and consistency of enforcement. Many officials 
perceive the guidelines of the new disclosure system of inspection reports, the 
Oiva system, as helpful in enhancing the consistency of enforcement. Further 
efforts are nevertheless needed to establish the system and unify the 
interpretations.  
 
Respondent FBOs in approved dairy, fishery and meat establishments 
consider official food control to be important for food safety and appear to be 
generally satisfied with its quality. However, many FBOs perceive the 
consistency of official food control as poor, and particularly small-sized FBOs 
are critical of the relevance of control actions. The Oiva system raises early-
stage concerns among FBOs regarding the fairness and consistency of control. 
A perception of good co-operation with the official by FBOs is associated with 
their positive views about official food control and its importance.  
 
The results of this thesis indicate that local food safety enforcement is 
generally risk-based and control actions are progressively adjusted. However, 
the speed, familiarity and consistency of using administrative enforcement 
measures could be improved. Provision of more practical training for officials 
and further development of operating instructions and peer-review systems 
between and within units would likely increase the efficacy and consistency of 
enforcement. Improving the consistency of control actions would also enhance 
the trust of FBOs in the relevance and justness of control.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Food safety affects everyone. Food contaminated with pathogenic microbes or 
harmful chemical substances is estimated to cause illness for 600 million 
people each year, resulting in an annual loss of 33 million healthy life-years 
(World Health Organization [WHO], 2015). Ensuring that the basic need of 
safe food is met is a shared responsibility of food business operators (FBOs), 
the government and consumers (Käferstein, 2003).  
The food field is among the most heavily regulated sectors in the European 
Union (EU) (van der Meulen, 2013). The key purposes of food safety 
legislation are to protect the health and interests of consumers by ensuring 
that food is safe, wholesome and traceable, and that the information provided 
about the food is truthful, sufficient and accurate (European Communities 
[EC], 2002; Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [MAF], 2011b). In addition, 
food safety requirements aim at ensuring free and fair trade of food and 
improving the operating conditions for FBOs (EC, 2002; MAF, 2011b). In 
addition to food laws regulating the operations, agencies and effective 
methods for enforcement are required (Whitehead, 1995; Käferstein, 2003; 
Neeliah & Goburdhun, 2007). National food control systems often have 
limitations, such as obsolete food legislation, overlapping work, lack of 
resources and poor organization, weakening their efficacy (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO] & WHO, 2003a; 
Neeliah & Goburdhun, 2007). 
The current EU food safety legislation sets the primary legal responsibility 
for the safety of foodstuffs on FBOs at all stages of the food chain (EC, 2002). 
However, it is widely recognized that FBOs are not always able or willing to 
comply with the regulations (Henson & Heasman, 1998; Fairman & Yapp, 
2004; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Hirschauer et al., 2012). Official food control 
authorities therefore have the responsibility of ensuring that the FBOs have 
proper systems in place to manage the food safety risks in their operations and 
to comply with the legislative food safety requirements (EU, 2004d). In view 
of the costs of regulated food control, such as the costs of compliance for FBOs 
and the costs of administration and enforcement borne by FBOs and the 
government (Caswell, 1998; Henson & Heasman, 1998; Antle, 1999, 2000; 
Unnevehr & Jensen, 1999), it is important to conduct food control on a risk-
basis and efficiently. Thus, identifying risk-based priorities and ensuring 
effective enforcement are core principles underlying EU food safety legislation 
(EC, 1999; EU, 2004d). At the same time, assuring consistency between and 
within the enforcement agencies is a major challenge in enforcement of food 
safety regulations (Ho, 2017).  
The Finnish field of official food control has undergone changes with the 
introduction of the disclosure system of food inspection reports, ‘Oiva’, in 
2013. Moreover, the prospective reform of the organization of local 
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environmental health and food control, bringing together the tasks of the 
current 62 local food control units into 18 counties, makes the development of 
official food control a highly topical issue. Strengthening the efficacy, risk-
basis and consistency of control practices have been listed as objectives to 
improve the control of the Finnish food chain (Finnish Food Safety Authority 
Evira [Evira], 2015b, 2016e, 2017f). 
In its broad concept, ‘enforcement’ covers all possible control actions 
applied by regulatory agencies and other law enforcement bodies aimed at 
ensuring and verifying compliance with laws, regulations and rules (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Blanc, 2013). Enforcement actions range from guidance 
and education of the operators to inspections, testing and more coercive 
measures such as administrative procedures, sanctions and prosecutions 
(Blanc, 2013). In case of non-compliance, the EU food safety legislation obliges 
the competent authorities to take actions to ensure that the FBO remedies the 
situation (EU, 2004d). In Finland, these enforcement actions are defined in 
the Chapter 7 of the Food Act 23/2006 (MAF, 2011b) as administrative 
coercive measures. Improving efficacy in the use of administrative coercive 
measures is among the development objectives of official food control in 
Finland (Evira, 2017f), but scientific literature on this topic is scarce.  
In this thesis, the term ‘enforcement’ is used to cover all actions of official 
control when the efficacy, risk-basis, consistency or other qualities of official 
controls are discussed. ‘Enforcement measures’, in turn, refer specifically to 
the administrative coercive measures available for Finnish food control 
authorities defined in the Chapter 7 of the Food Act (MAF, 2011b). 
Correspondingly, ‘enforcement process’ refers to the administrative procedure 
involved in using enforcement measures, i.e. the hearing procedure, 
administrative decision making and verification of compliance. ‘Requests’, by 
contrast, refer to non-administrative demands to correct non-compliances set 
by the food control authority or officials as defined in Section 53 of the Food 
Act (MAF, 2011b).  
The term ‘risk-basis’ refers to the ability of food control authorities to 
adjust the control actions based on food safety risk caused by non-compliance, 
compliance history and level of own checks carried by the FBO (EU, 2004d). 
‘Efficacy’ is used to describe the impact of official food control on food safety 
by assessing the correction of non-compliances and improvement of the level 
of food hygiene in food premises (Hampton, 2005; Läikkö-Roto, 2016) as well 
as the promptness and fluency of the control procedures. ‘Consistency’ refers 
to the implementation of uniform principles and practices in enforcement 
within and between food control authorities in prioritization of enforcement 
approaches, use of control actions, adoption of national and internal 
guidelines and interpretation of the requirements set for FBOs (Läikkö-Roto 
et al., 2015; Läikkö-Roto, 2016; Tähkäpää, 2016). 
‘Food premises’ refers to any company processing, selling, serving or 
distributing food. ‘Approved establishment’ or ‘establishment’ refers to a food 
premises handling, preparing or producing foodstuff of animal origin, such as 
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meat, fish and dairy products, that has to be approved in accordance with 
Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 (EU, 2004b, 
2004c). Approved establishments attract specific regulatory attention because 
food of animal origin is a major vehicle for foodborne outbreaks (Gould et al., 
2013; European Food Safety Authority [EFSA] & European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control [ECDC], 2016). As trust of FBOs in food control 
officials has been associated with their motivation to comply with food safety 
regulations (Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Meyer et al., 2017), understanding the 
factors affecting their attitude towards and perceptions of official food control 
is of particular importance. 
  The aim of this thesis was to evaluate food safety enforcement from two 
perspectives: by examining the views and control actions of food control 
officials and by exploring the perceptions of FBOs.  
 16 
 
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 FOOD SAFETY AND PUBLIC HEALTH  
 FOODBORNE ILLNESSES AND THE FOOD CHAIN 
Food safety is an essential part of public health as food consumption influences 
the nutrition and health of all people. Although some traditional food-related 
infections, such as tuberculosis or typhoid fever, have been largely eradicated 
or controlled in industrialized countries (Tauxe & Esteban, 2006), foodborne 
illnesses remain a substantial global burden (Scallan et al., 2011; WHO, 2015; 
EFSA & ECDC, 2016).  
Food is a potential vehicle for many infectious disease causative agents, 
including pathogenic bacteria, e.g. Salmonella, Campylobacter, Listeria 
monocytogenes, Escherichia coli and Clostridium perfringens (McCabe-
Sellers, & Beattie, 2004), viruses such as norovirus and hepatitis A and E 
(Koopmans et al., 2002; Koopmans & Duizer, 2004; Iturriza-Gomara & 
O’Brien, 2016) and protozoa such as Cryptosporidium, Giardia and 
Toxoplasma (Nichols, 2000; Dawson, 2005). In addition to microbiological 
food safety risks, acute illnesses or long-term diseases can be caused by 
chemical substances in food (WHO, 2015). These include, for instance, 
naturally occurring toxins such as mycotoxins, marine biotoxins and biogenic 
amines, food additives, environmental contaminants such as heavy metals, 
dioxins, pesticides and veterinary drug residues, and process contaminants 
like acrylamide (Alexander et al., 2012; Evira, 2014a; Ng & von Goetz, 2017). 
Among global food safety and public health risks, antimicrobial resistance is 
one of the most topical and urgent concerns (Marshall & Levy, 2011; Verraes 
et al., 2013; Roca et al., 2015; Ferri et al., 2017; EFSA & ECDC, 2018). 
The annual global burden of foodborne illnesses is estimated to be 600 
million illnesses and 420 000 deaths; in Europe, the annual burden is 23 
million illnesses and 5000 deaths (WHO, 2015). In Finland, the reported 
foodborne outbreaks cause approximately 1500 illnesses annually (Evira, 
2016c, 2017d). The most common vehicles for foodborne outbreaks in the EU 
as well as in the United States are animal origin foodstuffs: meat, poultry, dairy 
products and eggs (Gould et al., 2013; EFSA & ECDC, 2016).  
Preventing foodborne outbreaks requires the united effort of all operators 
throughout the food supply chain: food processors, retailers, food service 
personnel and consumers (Tauxe, 2002; Käferstein, 2003; McCabe-Sellers & 
Beattie, 2004; Aruoma, 2006; Lupien, 2007). The globalization of the food 
trade and the increasing complexity of food supply networks pose challenges 
for prevention of foodborne illnesses (Robertson et al., 2003; Flint et al., 2005; 
Raspor, 2008; Tauxe et al., 2010). Through the wide distribution of foodstuffs, 
possible health hazards at the production level may affect large populations, 
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not only locally but also globally (Tauxe et al., 2010). In the EU, the food chain 
employs more than 47 million persons in over 15 million companies engaged 
in primary production, the food processing industry or food retail or services 
(European Commission [COM], 2015). In Finland, the entire food chain 
employs a total of 300 000 people (Hyrylä, 2016), and the number of food 
premises under official food control of is over 75 000 (Evira, 2016e). 
 FOOD SAFETY RISK FACTORS IN FOOD PREMISES 
Recognized, reported and investigated outbreaks represent only the peak of 
the iceberg regarding actual outbreaks (WHO, 2008, 2015; Greig & Ravel, 
2009; Gould et al., 2013). Most reported foodborne outbreaks derive from 
places in which food is consumed or prepared for consumption, such as 
restaurants, workplace catering or households (Gould et al., 2013; EFSA & 
ECDC, 2016), probably because the traceability of the source of illness of 
several people eating at the same place is easier than that of individual or 
sporadic cases occurring in different places (McCabe-Sellers & Beattie, 2004). 
Food can become contaminated during any stage of the food chain, and unless 
the survival and/or growth of pathogens is controlled during food processing 
the risk of an illness derived from food increases (Nyachuba, 2010). Inabilities 
to control certain factors related to the operations or the working practices of 
food handling personnel of food premises are especially reported to be 
associated with the occurrence of foodborne outbreaks (Buchholz et al., 2002; 
Gormley et al., 2011; United States Food and Drug Administration [US FDA], 
2013; EFSA & ECDC, 2016). These critical food safety factors include use of 
clean water and raw materials from safe sources, appropriate temperature 
control during preparation and storage of food, prevention of cross-
contamination between raw and cooked foods, and proper personal and hand 
hygiene of food handlers (Buchholz et al., 2002; US FDA, 2013; Gormley et al., 
2011; EFSA & ECDC, 2016). Improper temperature control is the main 
contributing factor to reported foodborne outbreaks (Todd, 1997; Olsen et al., 
2000), and violations of temperature control have been described to increase 
the likelihood of a restaurant being a source of an outbreak (Irwin et al., 1989). 
Hand hygiene has been noted to have a significant role in, for example, 
transmission of noroviruses (Barrabeig et al., 2010; Rönnqvist et al., 2014; 
Boxman et al., 2015) and outbreaks caused by Salmonella (Kimura et al., 2005; 
Medus et al., 2006). 
Despite their importance for prevention of foodborne outbreaks, violations 
of critical food safety factors are relatively commonly observed during routine 
inspections of food premises (Phillips et al., 2006; Reske et al., 2007; Guiducci 
et al., 2011). Recent studies have reported an absence of temperature storage 
records in 34% of catering service kitchens (Garayoa et al., 2017) and 
temperature violations in 50% of food products in retail stores (Lundén et al., 
2014b). Temperature violations have also been noted among the most 
common reasons behind the use of enforcement measures (Lundén, 2013). 
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Unsatisfactory hygienic working practices and deficient prevention of cross-
contamination are also rather frequently reported among food handlers (Baş 
et al., 2006; Kwon et al., 2014; Garayoa et al., 2017).  
 
2.2 FOOD SAFETY REGULATION CONCERNING FOOD 
PREMISES 
 PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENT OF FOOD 
SAFETY LEGISLATION 
Food law and regulations build a foundation for a food control system 
(Whitehead, 1995). The principal objectives of food safety legislation and 
control systems are to protect the health and interests of consumers by 
ensuring the safety and traceability of food and that the information given 
about food is truthful and sufficient (EC, 2002; MAF, 2011b). In addition, food 
safety requirements aim at facilitating the trade of food and improving the 
operating conditions for FBOs (EC, 2002; MAF, 2011b). The primary legal 
responsibility for ensuring food safety lays with FBOs (COM, 1999; EC, 2002). 
Official control systems established at both national and EU levels have the 
responsibility of enforcing the legislation and ensuring the compliance of 
FBOs (COM, 1999; EU, 2004d).  
Setting rules for the sale of food to protect people from adulterated or poor-
quality food have been a goal of governing authorities since the earliest 
documented eras of human history (FAO & WHO, 2016). International 
harmonized standards facilitating the trade of safe foods started to take place 
in the early 20th century, and the current global food safety legislation was 
founded in 1963, when FAO and WHO established the Codex Alimentarius 
(Codex) or "Food Code" (FAO & WHO, 2016). Codex is a set of food standards, 
codes of practice and guidelines aiming at harmonized international food 
standards to protect consumer health and promote fair practices in 
international food trade. Today, the Codex Commission consists of 188 
member countries, covering 99% of the world’s population; the EU is a 
member organisation. The Codex standards, produced and updated based on 
scientific evidence, are recommendations for voluntary compliance by 
members, but in many governments and non-governmental organizations, 
they serve as a basis for legislation and regulations (FAO & WHO, 2016).  
Major food safety or fraud crises in recent decades, such as “mad cow 
disease” (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, BSE) in the United Kingdom 
(UK) in 1996, dioxins in feed in Belgium in 1999, melamine in Chinese milk in 
2008 and the horse meat scandal in Europe in 2013, have made food safety a 
“hot” topic in politics and in the media and among consumers (Raspor, 2008; 
Newell et al., 2010; Aung & Chang, 2014; Bánáti, 2014; Barnett et al., 2016). 
In addition, the crises have challenged the credibility of the food industry and 
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led to demands for more effective, risk-based, consistent and transparent food 
safety regulation, standards and controls (Vos, 2000; Aung & Chang, 2014). 
As a consequence of the BSE crisis revealing serious shortcomings in the 
existing European food law, EU food safety regulations were changed from an 
ad hoc principle to a more precautionary and integrated approach to food 
safety (Vos, 2000; Caduff & Bernauer, 2006; Halkier & Holm, 2006; van der 
Meulen, 2013). In its White Paper on Food Safety in January 2000 (COM, 
1999), the European Commission declared the objective of the future 
development of European food safety law. The principles proclaimed as being 
fundamental for public health protection policy – scientific advice as a basis 
for all regulatory activities, risk assessment in identifying control priorities, 
and greater transparency in decision-making and control – set the foundation 
for a new food safety approach (COM, 1999). The aim was to guarantee a high 
level of food safety by creating a new legal framework covering all sectors of 
the food chain from farm to fork, including feed production, primary 
production, food processing, storage, distribution and retail sale (COM, 1999).  
In parallel to the public regulatory response to the demand for more 
effective food safety controls and the shift of legislative responsibility of food 
safety towards FBOs, the collaboration between the public and private food 
sectors has increasingly evolved (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007; Garcia Martinez 
et al., 2013; Rouviere & Royer, 2017). The basic principle in the collaborative 
regulatory strategy involving public and private partnership in the food safety 
field, commonly termed ‘co-regulation’ (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007, 2013) or 
‘enforced self-regulation’ (Fairman & Yapp, 2005), is that the government 
imposes requirements on FBOs to develop and implement their own risk 
management systems to ensure, monitor and verify compliance with the 
regulations (Fairman & Yapp, 2005; Garcia Martinez et al., 2007; Hutter & 
Amodu, 2008). To respond to the challenges of an internationalized food chain 
and increased consumer demands, the food industry has also increasingly 
adopted private quality assurance and standard systems on top of the 
legislative requirements (Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008; Garcia Martinez et al., 
2013).  
 GENERAL FOOD SAFETY LEGISLATION 
The EU food safety legislation is based on the requirements of the Codex 
standards (Poli, 2004). Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, or “General Food Law”, 
is the foundation of EU food and feed law (EC, 2002). It lays down the general 
principles and requirements of food and feed safety law, covering all stages of 
the food chain. According to the General Food Law, only safe food can be 
placed on the EU market, and food is deemed safe if it complies with the basic 
criteria established in law. When food is unsafe, FBOs are obliged to withdraw 
or recall it from the market and to carry out other measures required by the 
competent national authority to ensure that the food safety risk is reduced or 
eliminated (EC, 2002).  
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To complement the EU legislation, member states may also have their own 
national legislation with respect to food safety, provided that this is not in 
conflict with the requirements set out by the EU legislation. The adoption of 
EU directives into national rules can, however, vary considerably between 
member states due to differing national legal systems and political and 
administrative actors (Steunenberg, 2006). In Finland, the national food 
safety legislation is built around Food Act 23/2006 (MAF, 2011b), which lays 
down the general requirements concerning food premises, the handling, 
storing and transportation of food, own-check plan, food hygiene competence 
of food handlers, and notification of food premises and application for 
approval as a food establishment (MAF, 2011b).  
 LEGISLATION ON HYGIENE IN FOOD PREMISES 
Effective food safety risk management from farm to fork during handling, 
storing, preparing and serving of food is the basis for reducing the risk of 
foodborne illnesses. The general requirements for the hygiene of foodstuffs 
and hygienic handling of food are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 
(EU, 2004a). The regulation applies to all foodstuff and all FBOs from farm to 
fork and contains general obligations for the hygiene of food handling, 
premises and equipment, personal hygiene and training, and temperature 
processes (EU, 2004a). The structure and wording of the legislation allow 
flexible and relative application of the rules.  
Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 lays down the requirements for 
implementing good hygiene practices (GHP) and Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points (HACCP) -based food safety management procedures (EU, 
2004a). Originally developed by the American space agency NASA to ensure 
that astronauts would not suffer from foodborne illnesses during their stay in 
space, HACCP is a system that identifies, evaluates and controls the physical, 
chemical and biological hazards in the operations that could endanger food 
safety (FAO & WHO, 2003b; van der Meulen, 2013). HACCP principles have 
been adopted in the Codex Alimentarius standards as a food safety 
management system worldwide (FAO & WHO, 2003b; van der Meulen, 2013). 
In the EU legislation, the requirements to establish and maintain food safety 
programmes and procedures based on the HACCP principles apply to all 
FBOs, with the exception of primary production (EU, 2004a). If identification 
or monitoring of critical control points is not possible, GHP can replace them 
in certain operations (EU, 2004a). 
Due to the frequently reported health hazards presented by foodstuffs of 
animal origin (Gould et al. 2013; EFSA & ECDC, 2016), their production and 
placing on the market are considered to require specific hygiene rules, which 
are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 (EU, 2004b). According to this 
regulation, establishments handling foodstuffs of animal origin, e.g. meat, 
fishery products, milk and dairy products, shall not operate unless approved 
by the competent authority. The regulation sets detailed requirements for the 
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structural, operational and hygiene requirements for the establishments; 
temperature requirements during storage and transport of foodstuffs; and 
health and identification marking of foodstuffs (EU, 2004b).   
In addition to regulations regarding operations and hygiene in food 
premises, EU legislation lays down some specific requirements, for instance, 
for the provision of food information to consumers (EU, 2011) and 
microbiological criteria for foods regarding certain micro-organisms (EU, 
2005). The regulation on food information prescribes detailed requirements 
for the accuracy and truthfulness of the information given on food, in 
particular food labelling, regarding the identity, composition, properties or 
other characteristics of the food (EU, 2011).  
To complement the requirements set in the EU food hygiene regulations, 
Finland has national legislation on food hygiene and safety. The Finnish 
Decree of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry on food hygiene in 
registered food premises 1367/2011 and the Decree of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry on food hygiene in approved food establishments 
795/2014 lay down more detailed structural and operational requirements for 
the facilities, and requirements on the temperature of the food during 
processing, storage and transport, on the hygienic work routines of personnel, 
and on in-house control and its documentation by FBOs (MAF, 2011a, 2014a). 
The Decree of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 834/2014 sets 
requirements on packed and unpacked foodstuff delivered to consumers 
regarding the language of the labelling, marking of the batch number of the 
food and information given on allergenic substances (MAF, 2014b). 
 
2.3 COMPLIANCE IN FOOD BUSINESS 
 MOTIVATION TO COMPLY 
The compliance process in food business, as described by Henson and 
Heasman (1998), is a cycle of decision-making activities, during which the 
company chooses whether and when to comply with a regulation and the 
actions taken to reach compliance. Furthermore, the company evaluates the 
outcome of the compliance strategy and adjusts its activities accordingly 
(Henson & Heasman, 1998). The decisions concerning what has to be done to 
comply depend on the type and administrative form of the regulation; for 
instance, regulations regarding specific temperature requirements are rather 
clear, whereas a requirement to implement good hygiene practices allows 
broader interpretation (Henson & Heasman, 1998).  
In addition to the incentives set by the regulatory requirements 
(Hammoudi et al., 2009; Mensah & Julien, 2011), motivational factors to 
implement food safety management systems include e.g. product safety and 
quality improvements, customer requirements and consumer awareness 
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(Mensah & Julien, 2011; Fernando et al., 2014). The costs of non-compliance, 
such as economic losses due to possible fines, recalls and withdrawals of the 
foodstuffs from the market or cessation of operations, also encourage FBOs to 
comply with the food safety requirements (Hammoudi et al., 2009). Fairman 
and Yapp (2004) concluded that the compliance decision-making process may 
not be made internally and independently, but the motivation to comply is 
influenced by external factors such as encounters with enforcement officers or 
trade association information.  
 CHALLENGES OF FBOS TO MANAGE FOOD SAFETY RISKS 
AND COMPLY WITH LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS 
Financial, infrastructural and people-related constraints of FBOs to 
implement food safety management system and comply with food safety 
regulations are widely reported in scientific literature (Table 1). The 
propensity of a food business company to adopt food safety practices are 
associated by several characteristics of the company such as the size, industry 
subsector, the country of ownership and control, level of innovativeness and 
export orientation and forms of regulatory food safety inspections (Herath et 
al., 2007). Moreover, several authors emphasize the role of the food safety 
culture of the company in building the basis for food safety management and 
promoting hygienic practices (Clayton & Griffith, 2008; Griffith et al., 2010a; 
Powell et al., 2011; Strohbehn et al., 2014). According to Griffith et al. (2010b), 
the “cultural” factors contributing to food safety performance could include 
food safety management systems, food safety commitment, food safety 
environment, risk perception, leadership, and communication. Other authors 
note the importance of a suitable working environment and qualified, 
committed and motivated personnel for a functioning HACCP system (Jevšnik 
et al., 2008b; Fotopoulos et al., 2009). A recent study in the UK concludes that 
implementing food safety culture has a broad potential and support among 
food safety stakeholders, but the tools used for assessing food safety culture in 
food businesses should be further developed (Nayak & Waterson, 2017). 
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Table 1.  Commonly reported hurdles, difficulties or deficiencies among FBOs to comply 
with food safety regulations or implement food safety management systems. 
Hurdle to compliance  Reference 
Lack of knowledge or understanding of food 
safety management or the legislative 
requirements  
Walker et al., 2003a, 2003b; Fairman & 
Yapp, 2004; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Baş et 
al., 2007; Violaris et al., 2008; Fotopoulos et 
al., 2011; Mensah & Julien, 2011; Karaman, 
2012; Karaman et al., 2012; Lundén et al., 
2014b; Smigic et al., 2016  
Financial hurdles or fear of increase of costs  Fairman & Yapp, 2004; Eves & Dervisi, 
2005; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Violaris et al., 
2008; Mensah & Julien, 2011; Karaman et 
al., 2012; Nevas et al., 2013; Wengle, 2015 
Lack of personnel, facilities or time to 
implement food safety management 
systems 
Panisello & Quantick, 2001; Eves & Dervisi, 
2005; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Baş et al., 
2007; Mensah & Julien, 2011; Nevas et al., 
2013; Luning et al., 2015; Wengle, 2015 
Lack of motivation or interest towards or 
poor commitment to food safety 
management systems  
Panisello & Quantick, 2001; Eves & Dervisi, 
2005; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Baş et al., 
2007; Fotopoulos et al., 2011 
Lack of trust in food safety legislation and 
food control officials  
Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Meyer et al., 2017 
Limited ability to identify hazards and take 
into account the risks involved in the 
operations  
Panisello et al., 1999; Eves & Dervisi, 2005; 
Fielding et al., 2005; Nevas et al., 2013 
Lack of manager or organizational 
contribution supportive of maintaining safe 
food handling practices or implementing 
HACCP 
Pragle et al., 2007; Bánáti & Lakner, 2012 
 
 
A particular challenge appears to be ensuring adequate expertise in food safety 
requirements. For instance, the detected discrepancies between the own-
checking records of retail FBOs and observations made during official 
inspections (Lundén et al., 2014a) indicate that some FBOs have inadequate 
ability to ensure proper temperatures of the foodstuffs with their in-house 
control. Moreover, as reported by Haukijärvi and Lundén (2017), waiving of 
pre-inspections and pre-approvals of restaurants has weakened the 
compliance concerning the infrastructure of the premises relative to the time 
when pre-approval was needed before initiation of operations, indicating that 
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FBOs may have deficient knowledge of the requirements of food premises and 
preconditions of GHPs. 
To strengthen the knowledge of food handlers and to promote their positive 
attitudes towards food hygiene, education and training appear beneficial 
(Abdul-Mutalib et al., 2012; Ko, 2013; McIntyre et al., 2013; Läikkö-Roto & 
Nevas, 2014b; Baser et al., 2017). However, conclusions drawn by other 
studies on the effectiveness of food handler training programmes and 
certification in improving the knowledge and hygienic practices of food 
handlers are conflicting, and several authors argue that an increase in the 
knowledge and awareness of hygienic practices may not automatically lead to 
changes in the behaviour of food handlers (Ehiri & Morris, 1996; Ehiri et al., 
1997; Clayton et al., 2002; Seaman & Eves, 2010a). Thus, many studies 
highlight the importance of an organizational contribution and manager 
support to achieve and maintain a culture supportive for safe food handling 
behaviour and hygienic practices (Ehiri et al., 1997; Clayton et al., 2002; 
Mitchell et al., 2007; Seaman & Eves, 2010b; Strohbehn et al., 2014; Smigic et 
al., 2016).  
2.3.2.1 Special challenges of establishments producing food of animal 
origin  
Establishments producing food of animal origin may face several challenges to 
meet the extensive legislative requirements (Hielm et al., 2006; Kotisalo & 
Nevas, 2009; Tähkäpää et al., 2009a; Karaman, 2012; Karaman et al., 2012; 
Nevas et al., 2013). In a study on European companies producing food of 
animal origin, Luning et al. (2015) reported that most companies have 
adequate food safety management systems, but activities related to 
verification and validation of the control systems appear to be more 
challenging. According to Finnish studies, the attitudes of employees of 
approved establishments towards the HACCP and in-house control systems 
are very positive (Hielm et al., 2006), but their implementation is more 
problematic (Tähkäpää et al., 2009a). Choosing the critical control points, 
committing all employees of the company to the system and documenting the 
monitoring results are considered particularly difficult (Hielm et al., 2006), 
and many FBOs wish for more guidance with planning the self-checking 
system (Nevas et al., 2013).  
In addition to HACCP and in-house control systems, the requirements seen 
as most problematic by the Finnish FBOs of approved establishments have 
been associated with the layout of the premises and transport routes, structure 
and maintenance of premises, control fees and labelling (Tähkäpää et al., 
2009a). Lacking or poor organization of premises and inadequate 
maintenance have been reported as the most common non-compliances 
among fishery and meat establishments (Kotisalo & Nevas, 2009). Moreover, 
particularly FBOs in meat and fish sectors have experienced the correction of 
non-compliances as financially difficult (Nevas et al., 2013) and have had 
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multiple and often serious non-compliances that have led to the use of 
administrative enforcement measures by control authorities (Lundén, 2013). 
Moreover, Tähkäpää et al. (2009a) reported that meat and fish business 
operators perceive differing interpretations of the requirements by the control 
authorities as problematic.  
2.3.2.2 Special challenges of small FBOs 
One of the core factors explaining differences in compliance among individual 
companies is the size of the company (Henson & Heasman, 1998; Fairman & 
Yapp, 2004). Based on the categorization by the Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as based on their number of employees, 
annual turnover, and/or annual balance sheet (COM, 2003), up to 99% of the 
companies in EU food and drink industry are SMEs (FoodDrinkEurope, 2016). 
In Finland, 75% of the food industry is micro-companies employing less than 
10 persons (Hyrylä, 2016). The classification of company sizes varies in the 
scientific literature, but several studies conclude that smaller companies often 
have particular difficulties in complying with food safety requirements or 
implementing food safety management systems (Panisello et al., 1999; Taylor, 
2001; Walker et al., 2003b; Fairman & Yapp, 2004; Fielding et al. 2005; Yapp 
& Fairman, 2006; Violaris et al., 2008; Tähkäpää, Kaario et al., 2009; Wilcock 
et al., 2011). Smaller FBOs may not perceive ensuring compliance with food 
safety regulations as a part of their operations, but rather as an outcome that 
is achieved when the requirements stated by the enforcement official are 
fulfilled (Fairman & Yapp, 2005; Yapp & Fairman, 2006). Also Taylor and 
Kane (2005) reported that smaller FBOs see the HACCP system as difficult 
and with hardly any benefits. Moreover, due to their possibly limited resources 
and capabilities, smaller FBOs presumably consider the burden of maintaining 
compliance and implementing food safety management systems as heavier 
than larger companies (Jayasinghe-Mudalige & Henson, 2007; Mensah & 
Julien, 2011; Wengle, 2015), thus being less likely to implement HACCP or 
other enhanced food safety assurance systems (Panisello et al., 1999; Herath 
et al., 2007). In a Spanish study, hygiene practices in small- and medium-sized 
retail food premises were reported to be indeed poorer than in large-sized 
FBOs (Pérez-Rodríguez et al., 2010). However, guidance and support can help 
smaller FBOs to improve implementation of food safety management systems 
(Taylor & Kane, 2005; Luning et al., 2015).  
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2.4 OFFICIAL FOOD CONTROL 
 LEGISLATION FOR OFFICIAL FOOD CONTROL 
Realization of rules and regulations requires effective enforcement and 
ensuring compliance with the requirements (Blanc, 2013; WHO, 2013; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2014). A 
well-functioning official food control system is essential for protecting public 
health (WHO, 2013; OECD, 2014), and it promotes the competiveness of the 
FBOs by preventing distorted competition between compliant and non-
compliant FBOs (Hampton, 2005). The legislative framework, available 
measures and procedures of enforcement vary among countries, but generally, 
official food control covers all mandatory regulatory enforcement activities by 
national or local authorities necessary to protect the consumers by ensuring 
the quality and safety of food during all stages of the food chain (FAO & WHO, 
2003a).  
In the EU, enforcement of food safety legislation is the responsibility of 
member states, which must maintain a system of official controls to monitor 
and verify that the FBOs fulfil the legislative requirements at all stages of the 
food chain (EC, 2002; EU, 2004d). The requirements for official food controls 
in the EU are set in Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 (EU, 2004d), and 
Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 lays down specific rules for the organization of 
official controls for products of animal origin intended for human 
consumption (EU, 2004c). Official control shall be impartial, consistent and 
of high quality (EU, 2004d). The controls shall be carried out regularly, on a 
risk basis and with appropriate frequency (EU, 2004d). The competent 
authority shall ensure that it has an adequate number of qualified and 
experienced staff to perform official controls effectively (EU, 2004d). The 
Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (DG Sante) carries out audits, 
inspections and related non-audit activities to ensure that the national 
authorities fulfil their legislative obligations and that EU rules are complied 
with in all member states (COM, 2017).  
 ORGANIZATION OF OFFICIAL FOOD CONTROL IN FINLAND 
The competent food control authorities, their duties and available control 
measures are defined in the Finnish Food Act (MAF, 2011b). Official food 
control is organized at three levels: locally, regionally and nationally. Most 
practical food control tasks are conducted at the local level in control units 
(henceforth “units”) formed of the municipal cooperation areas of 
environmental health and food control that consist of one or more 
municipalities (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2009; MAF, 2011b). 
Since the beginning of 2015, the number of units is 62 (Evira, 2015b, 2017f). 
The units operate under municipal authority bodies, which are multimember 
bodies named by the municipalities within the control unit (MAF, 2011b). 
 27 
 
Within their areas, each unit independently plans and implements the official 
food control tasks laid down in the EU food safety regulations and the Finnish 
Food Act (MAF, 2011b). Annually, the human resources designated for food 
safety control are approximately 718 labour-years, 253 of which are in the 
municipal food control units (Evira, 2017f). The head of the unit is often a 
veterinarian (Aas et al., 2004). 
Regionally, the units are guided by six Regional State Administrative 
Agencies that, within their areas of operation, direct and assess the 
performance of the municipal food control units (MAF, 2011b). Under the 
auspices of and national legislation drawn by the MAF, Evira coordinates, 
leads and develops nationwide food control and gives national guidelines on 
hygiene and regulations concerning food and in-house control by FBOs (MAF, 
2011b). Evira is also responsible for meat inspection and official food control 
in slaughterhouses and supervising or performing the control of the foodstuff 
of animal origin delivered to Finland from other EU member states (MAF, 
2011b). 
Other national food control authorities are the Finnish Customs and the 
Finnish Defence Forces. Finnish Customs is responsible for the control of 
foodstuffs other than animal origin imported to Finland from third party 
countries. The Defence Forces supervises the safety and compliance of 
foodstuffs in its own areas (MAF, 2011b). 
2.4.2.1 Resources and performance of local food control units 
The municipal independence, safeguarded in the Constitution of Finland 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011), may generate certain dissimilarities in conducting 
official food control tasks in local food control units, possibly setting FBOs in 
unequal positions depending to the location of their company (Tähkäpää et al., 
2008; Tähkäpää et al., 2009b). Ensuring adequate labour resources and their 
optimal allocation are ongoing issues in local food control (Tähkäpää et al., 
2008; Evira, 2014b, 2015b, 2017f; Läikkö-Roto et al., 2016). Several studies 
have reported variation among the units in resourcing of food control, in 
collecting control fees from FBOs and in risk-based approach (Tähkäpää et al., 
2008; Tähkäpää et al., 2009b; Lepistö et al., 2010; Heikkilä et al., 2016). As 
stated by Tähkäpää et al. (2008), weak knowledge of food control among 
municipal decision-makers and a low appreciation of the field of 
environmental health control are the most critical reasons for the lack of 
resources in local food control.  
Insufficient resources have been associated with inadequate 
implementation of local food control plans (Evira, 2014b, 2015b). Läikkö-Roto 
et al. (2016) reported that less than one-third of the heads of the units consider 
that restaurant inspections occur regularly and sufficiently in their units. 
Moreover, approximately one-third of the units consider their resources to be 
inadequate for providing guidance to FBOs (Evira, 2015b). The efficacy and 
appropriateness of official food control implemented by local food control are 
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evaluated by the Regional State Administrative Agencies (MAF, 2011b). The 
local food control officials have not, however, perceived the audits to be very 
useful and have been dissatisfied with the expertise of the regional officials 
performing the audits (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014a). Moreover, the 
evaluation results have not been sufficiently utilized in guiding and developing 
official food control (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014a). 
Despite the challenges related to resources and consistency of practices, the 
units appear to be capable of ensuring adequate facilities and equipment for 
conducting official food control tasks (Läikkö-Roto et al, 2016). Guidance 
papers, pre forma templates and possibilities to hold collective discussions 
about the control cases within the unit have been reported to be important for 
the quality and efficacy of control (Läikkö-Roto et al, 2016). However, 
incomplete commitment to and familiarization with the operating procedures, 
quality systems and templates of their unit among the officials, poor 
orientation of the personnel and existence of tacit knowledge have been 
defined as factors potentially weakening the quality and efficacy of control 
(Läikkö-Roto et al., 2016). Moreover, experienced negative work stress among 
officials and their insufficient abilities to allocate work hours to become 
familiar with new legislation and guidelines may decrease employee 
performance and quality of work (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2016). Management 
skills of the heads of the units are thus considered fundamental for the units 
to conduct high-quality controls (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2016).  
2.4.2.2 Prospective reform in organization of official food control 
Several recent reports have investigated different possibilities to organize 
official food control in Finland (Hirn, 2011; Nevas & Lepistö, 2015; Tarasti, 
2016). Hirn (2011) concluded that the organization of environmental health 
and food control is multi-tier both horizontally and vertically, causing the 
system to be expensive, heavy and ineffective and leading to ambiguity among 
jurisdictions and inequality both regionally and locally (Hirn, 2011). According 
to Nevas and Lepistö (2015), the primary needs entail developing the central 
guidance system and establishing a joint database for reporting the control 
data, but the size of the units could be increased by forming larger regional 
units and allocating the resources of the Regional State Administrative 
Agencies to practical control tasks. Tähkäpää et al. (2008) have, however, 
already earlier expressed their concerns related to larger control units. In 
larger units, the possibilities for the officials to specialize in certain areas and 
improve their expertise likely increase. However, the decision-making 
covering larger entities and the decision-makers being farther away from the 
practical work and the personnel could weaken their knowledge and 
appreciation of the field, thus resulting in less funding and resources 
(Tähkäpää et al., 2008). On the other hand, according to Kotisalo et al. (2015), 
centralization of meat inspection tasks has standardized meat inspection fees 
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and improved the guidance provided by the central authority to official 
veterinarians.  
A major reform is anticipated in environmental health and food control at 
the beginning of 2020. On the basis of suggestions made by Tarasti (2016), the 
environmental health and food control tasks of municipal units will be brought 
together into 18 counties (Government of Finland, 2017a, 2018). With respect 
to food control, the reform aims at reducing administrative levels in control 
and supervision, improving the consistency and cost efficacy of control and 
creating better possibilities for specialization and expertise (Government of 
Finland, 2017a). If a municipality has adequate resources, it could organize 
certain environmental health control tasks on its own (Government of 
Finland, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
2.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 
 RISK-BASIS OF ENFORCEMENT 
The demand for risk-based regulation and enforcement arises from the need 
to target scarce public resources, to reduce the administrative burden on 
regulated business and to improve efficacy of enforcement (Black, 2005; 
Hampton, 2005, Garcia Martinez et al., 2013; OECD, 2014). The EU food 
safety legislation states that the control activities should be based on risks (EU, 
2004a, 2004d), while simultaneously allowing national or even local 
interpretation (van Asselt et al., 2012). The implementation of risk-based 
control comprises risk categorization and defining the frequency of controls 
accordingly (van Asselt et al., 2012), resulting in the FBOs with the highest risk 
bearing most of the burden of enforcement (Hampton, 2005). According to 
the General Food Law, ‘risk’ refers to the probability and severity of an adverse 
health effect caused by a hazard, whereas ‘hazard’ refers to a biological, 
chemical or physical agent in, or condition of, a food that potentially may cause 
an adverse health effect (EC, 2002). In defining the need and frequency of 
official food safety controls, the risks involved in a food business are 
determined on the basis of the nature and extent of the operations and the 
foodstuff produced, the results and reliability of the own checks and the 
compliance history of the FBO (EU, 2004d; Evira, 2017b). For instance, 
manufacturing large quantities of ready-to-eat foods from animal-origin raw 
ingredients requiring controlled temperature conditions poses a greater risk 
than small-scale retail selling of packed dry food at room temperature, thus 
warranting more frequent and time-consuming inspections (Evira, 2017b). 
Furthermore, the inspection frequency of an FBO with several excellent 
inspection results can be reduced, whereas non-compliances observed during 
inspections result in additional inspections (Evira, 2017b).  
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Risk should be considered at all levels of the decision-making involved in 
regulatory enforcement – from allocation of resources to proportionate 
enforcement approaches and sanctioning actions (FAO, 2008; OECD, 2014). 
Ensuring the use of a consistent definition of risk by all control authorities is 
essential (OECD, 2014). However, the qualitative risk assessment involved in 
food safety regulation allowing flexibility and discretion critically relies on the 
expertise and experience of the control officials making the subjective 
judgments (Black & Baldwin, 2010). According to a Finnish study, food control 
officials appear to implement a risk-based approach and relativity in practice 
by taking the compliance history of an FBO into account in determining 
inspection frequencies and strictness of control actions (Läikkö-Roto et al., 
2015). However, “evaluation of food hygiene and operational hygiene” and 
“evaluation of the severity of neglecting legislative requirements, and needed 
control actions” were considered to be among the most necessary training 
areas by the officials (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015).  
 EFFICACY OF ENFORCEMENT 
The efficacy of official food control can be assessed by analysing the impact of 
official food control on the hygiene of a food premises, the role of inspections 
in detecting non-compliances and the ability of control actions to ensure that 
the non-compliances are corrected (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b; Läikkö-Roto 
et al., 2015; Läikkö-Roto, 2016). Furthermore, effective enforcement involves 
the ability of authorities to simply and effectively communicate their 
requirements to FBOs, thus increasing awareness and understanding of FBOs 
regarding the regulations (Hampton, 2005). The efficacy or cost-efficiency of 
enforcement can be assessed through the ability of controls to conduct 
efficacious interventions and achieve the desired aim – compliance – with a 
minimum waste of resources of authorities, such as money, time or effort 
(Hampton, 2005; Läikkö-Roto, 2016), and without an excessive 
administrative burden on FBOs (Hampton, 2005).  
Adoption of the variety of available enforcement tools, from educational 
approach to formal actions, is an essential part of efficacious food safety 
enforcement (Yapp & Fairman, 2006). Efficacy of enforcement can be assessed 
on the basis of the control authorities being able to, on one hand, penalize 
persistent non-compliers, and on the other hand, reward compliant 
performance by FBOs (Hampton, 2005). Adequately deterrent effect of 
penalties prevents the most negligent FBOs from offending the regulations 
(Hampton, 2005) and may help consumers feel confident about the safety of 
the food supply chain and its control (Barnett et al., 2016). However, the 
enforcement methods and sanctions employed differ between EU member 
states: for instance, cases of food fraud are seldom taken to court in Finland, 
whereas FBOs are prosecuted for similar offences in the UK (Tähkäpää et al., 
2015; Tähkäpää, 2016). Moreover, the observed negligence by Finnish FBOs 
towards the instructions and orders given by control officials indicate that the 
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control measures used may not be sufficiently rapid or efficacious to prevent 
repeated violations (Tähkäpää et al., 2015; Tähkäpää, 2016). Also Lepistö 
(2008) concluded that if stricter control measures are not adequately used and 
food safety offences remain unreported to the police, no case law or 
homogeneous convention of penalties is formed, leading to diminished 
efficacy of regulations and control measures. Unequal treatment of FBOs and 
recurrence of violations may enable distortion of competition between FBOs 
and jeopardize public health (Tähkäpää, 2016). 
 UNIFORMITY AND CONSISTENCY OF ENFORCEMENT 
Equality is a basic legal right and a fundamental principle of good governance 
(Ministry of Justice, 2003, 2011; COM, 2012). FBOs shall thus be treated on 
an equal basis and the acts of the food control authority shall be impartial and 
proportionate to their objective (Ministry of Justice, 2003; EU, 2004d). 
However, the national-level implementation and enforcement of EU food 
hygiene legislation varies between member states (Havinga, 2014). Thus, 
perceived or actual inconsistency is a common challenge in official food 
control and enforcement practices within and between local control 
authorities (e.g. Fairman & Yapp, 2005; Hutter & Amodu, 2009; Mascini & 
Wijk, 2009; Pham et al., 2010a; Ho, 2012, 2017; Lee-Woolf et al., 2015; Meyer 
et al., 2017). A Finnish study reports that only 7% of local food control officials 
conducting restaurant inspections consider official food control to be uniform 
throughout the country (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015). 
Characteristics of the local authority, such as size, resources and location, 
have been reported to affect enforcement practices (Hutter & Amodu, 2009; 
Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015). Also legislative food safety requirements that allow 
flexible interpretation and are enforced at the discretion of authorities may be 
problematic from the viewpoint of consistent treatment of FBOs and cause 
inconsistency in the regulatory outcomes (Hutter & Amodu, 2009). 
Inconsistency among inspecting officials as well as between local food control 
units has been reported in inspection practices, documentation of observed 
non-compliances and issuing of demands for their correction (Läikkö-Roto et 
al., 2015). Differences among inspectors have been reported to affect the 
detection of violations and scoring of inspections (Lee et al., 2012) and the 
selection of enforcement methods in non-compliance cases (Mascini & Wijk, 
2009; Johnson et al., 2014; Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015). To improve consistency 
of control, many scholars recommend standardized inspection schemes and 
regular retraining of inspectors on violation assessment (Jones et al., 2004; 
Lee et al. 2012; Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015) as well as peer review among officials 
(Ho, 2017). 
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2.6 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN FOOD SAFETY 
CONTROL 
Inspections and other enforcement activities, ranging from guidance and 
education to more coercive measures such as administrative procedures, 
sanctions and prosecutions, are the main form through which the regulated 
business experiences regulations (Blanc, 2013). The approach adopted by the 
enforcement agencies, i.e. the way in which the enforcement activities are 
conducted, influences how the rules are realized (May & Winter, 2011; Blanc, 
2013). ‘Enforcement strategy’ refers to the tactical choices made and the 
different types of actions taken by a regulatory agency, i.e. prioritization 
regarding the rules to be enforced, items and regulated businesses to be 
inspected and enforcement methods employed (May & Burby, 1998). The 
choice of practices and strategies is suggested to be shaped by an agency's 
underlying approach, or philosophy, to enforcement (May & Burby, 1998). 
‘Enforcement style’, in turn, refers to the interaction between an inspector and 
a regulatee, i.e. whether an inspector is strict or lenient, attempts to enforce 
the “letter” or the “spirit” of the law, or acts as a consultant explaining the rules 
or as a policeman enforcing the law (May & Burby, 1998; May, 2004; May & 
Winter, 2011). The way in which inspectors apply their discretion is influenced 
by the responsiveness of the regulatee and by the attitudes and assessment of 
the inspector regarding the ability and willingness of a regulatee to comply 
(May & Winter, 2011; Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015).  
The motivation of regulatees to comply with regulations is influenced by 
the enforcement approach by the control official (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; 
May, 2004; Fairman & Yapp, 2005; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Läikkö-Roto & 
Nevas, 2014b). The initial approach of food control officials should be seeking 
voluntary compliance with legal requirements by the FBOs (Whitehead, 1995). 
A responsive approach, i.e. adjusting enforcement actions based on the 
performance and compliance history of the business, starting with an advisory 
approach and progressing to more formal and coercive actions if co-operation 
fails to prevent non-compliance, is considered to be optimal in promoting 
compliance (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; OECD, 2014). 
However, other papers have raised questions regarding the applicability of the 
responsive approach in practical inspection and enforcement encounters (May 
& Wood, 2003; Mascini & Wijk, 2009). Regulatees may associate 
responsiveness and flexibility of officials with inconsistent interpretations, 
which, in turn, may undermine their understanding of rules and weaken 
compliance (May & Wood, 2003). As regulatees value clarity and consistency 
in requirements, finding a balance between formal and facilitative approaches 
and achieving the benefits of co-operation without negative effects of 
inconsistency poses a challenge for enforcers (May & Wood, 2003). 
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 INSPECTIONS AND GUIDANCE  
Several studies have demonstrated the positive influence of inspections on 
food safety and compliance of FBOs (e.g. Buchholz et al. 2002; Reske et al., 
2007; Guiducci et al., 2011; Nevas, et al., 2013; Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b; 
Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015). However, assessing the direct association between 
inspection results and food safety indicators is not simple, as restaurant 
inspection results as such do not necessarily predict the occurrence of 
foodborne outbreaks (Cruz et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2004; Powell et al., 2013) 
or correlate with the microbial levels of foodstuffs (Kjeldgaard et al., 2010; 
Leisner et al. 2014). Moreover, some studies have argued that inspections 
alone may be insufficient in promoting a major improvement in food premises 
with recurrent violations (Phillips et al., 2006), and that an increased 
inspection frequency as such does not straightforwardly improve compliance 
(Newbold et al., 2008). Officials also tend to focus on evaluating visual or rule-
based items rather than critical and risk-based items on inspections, 
decreasing the value of inspections and raising a need for more training on 
risk-based approaches for officials (Green & Kane, 2014; Läikkö-Roto et al., 
2015). To increase the risk-basis of food service inspections, use of weighted 
scores according to severity of the violations is suggested (da Cunha et al., 
2016b). Also among high-risk companies producing food of animal origin, an 
operational inspection scoring tool with promising results has been designed 
(Stadlmüller et al., 2017). 
An advisory approach by enforcement officials has been shown to have an 
important role in helping small-scale FBOs achieve compliance and improve 
food safety practices (Fairman & Yapp, 2005; Yapp & Fairman 2006; Buckley, 
2015). Among restaurant business operators, a positive association is reported 
between their attitudes towards official food control and hygiene in their food 
premises (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b). The attitude towards official control, 
in turn, is affected by the level of co-operation with the official and by the 
advisory approach of the official (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b). Also among 
FBOs of approved establishments, Nevas et al. (2013) emphasize the 
importance of the guidance given by the inspecting official and the 
communication between the FBO and official in helping the FBOs to commit 
to food safety and in raising FBOs’ awareness of food safety risks in their 
operations. The nature of communication and the relationship between the 
official and the FBO may also influence regulatees’ perceptions of consistency 
of enforcement (Hutter & Amodu, 2009; Mascini & Wijk, 2009; Davies et al., 
2014). 
 ENFORCEMENT IN CASE OF NON-COMPLIANCE  
Food control authorities must provide FBOs with the necessary instructions 
and requests to ensure compliance with food safety regulations (MAF, 2011b). 
In case an FBO does not comply despite requests, EU food control legislation 
defines the national enforcement actions to be taken by the competent 
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authorities (EU, 2004d). The actions may include imposition of sanitation 
procedures, restriction or prohibition of placing a food on the market, ordering 
the recall, withdrawal and/or destruction of food, suspension of operations or 
closure of all or part of the business concerned (EU, 2004d). When deciding 
which action to take, the authority should take into account the nature of the 
non-compliance and the compliance history of the FBO (EU, 2004d).  
The enforcement actions described in the Finnish Food Act are 
administrative coercive measures or compulsory procedures (henceforth 
referred to as “enforcement measures”) (Table 2). The use of enforcement 
measures comes into question if the FBO has not corrected the observed non-
compliances as requested by the food control official and the violations pose a 
risk of a health hazard (MAF, 2011b). The enforcement process comprises 
administrative decision-making steps that start from hearing of the FBO 
regarding the prospective administrative decision, progress to giving the 
enforcement decision and end with verifying that the FBO complies with the 
decision and corrects the non-compliances. Administrative enforcement 
measures differ from the requests given by food control authority or officials 
with respect to their legal binding force (Evira, 2012a). While requests are not 
binding on the FBOs and thus do not involve a hearing process or appealable 
decision, administrative enforcement measures are binding and require the 
administrative formalities. Neglected requests may, however, be taken into 
account when considering the use of enforcement measures (Evira, 2012a).   
The municipal authority bodies may delegate the competence to apply the 
enforcement measures referred to in Sections 55–60 of the Finnish Food Act 
(Table 2) to the holder of the municipal office performing food control tasks 
such as the head of the unit or inspecting officials (MAF, 2011b). In urgent 
cases of severe health hazard, all municipal food control officials have the right 
to apply enforcement measures referred to in Sections 55, 56 and 58 of the 
Finnish Food Act even if no authority is delegated within the unit. Such 
decisions shall be submitted to the municipal authority body for consideration 
without delay (MAF, 2011b).  
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2.6.2.1 Good governance in food control decision-making 
The food control authorities use public power when applying enforcement 
measures, which may restrict the constitutional freedom of an FBO to engage 
in commercial activity or the right of protection of property (Lepistö, 2008; 
Lepistö & Hänninen, 2011). The authorities shall thus follow the legal 
requirements for administration and the principles of good governance laid 
down in Administrative Procedure Act 434/2003 (Ministry of Justice, 2003) 
and Constitution of Finland 731/1999 (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The 
governance shall be open and equal to everyone. Everyone should have her/his 
matter dealt with appropriately and without undue delay and receive a 
reasoned decision with the right of appeal (Ministry of Justice, 2003, 2011). 
The actions of an authority should be objective and relative to their aims 
(Ministry of Justice, 2003).  
Before a matter is decided, the authority should carry out a hearing 
procedure, in which the party concerned is given an opportunity to express 
her/his opinion and an explanation on the matter and to submit information 
which may have an effect on the decision (Ministry of Justice, 2003). The 
hearing should be in written form, unless an oral hearing is requested by the 
party (Ministry of Justice, 2003). The enforcement decision shall be provided 
in writing, indicating the action to be taken, the time limit for the action and 
the reasons for the decision, and information on the rights of the FBO to appeal 
the decision (EU, 2004d; Ministry of Justice, 2003). In case of an urgent 
matter, the decision may be issued orally, but without delay, it shall be issued 
in written form and provided with instructions for an appeal (Ministry of 
Justice, 2003).  
2.6.2.2 Use of administrative enforcement measures in Finland 
Studies on the use of enforcement measures in Finnish environmental health 
and food control have mainly focused on the realization of the principles of 
good governance and the effects of the legal aspects in their use (Lepistö, 
2008; Lepistö et al., 2009; Lepistö & Hänninen, 2011) and the perceptions of 
the food control officials regarding the use of the measures (Jokela et al., 
2009). In addition, Pahkala (2012) has investigated the use of enforcement 
measures in the largest control unit in Finland, the City of Helsinki 
Environment Centre. The studies have reported that the use of enforcement 
measures in Finnish food control is relatively infrequent, possibly due to 
uncertainty of food control officials concerning the enforcement practices 
(Lepistö, 2008; Jokela et al., 2009; Lepistö et al., 2009, Lepistö & Hänninen, 
2011). Although enforcement measures are mainly seen as important in 
strengthening food control actions and improving food safety (Jokela et al., 
2009; Lepistö & Hänninen, 2011), the administrative procedures are often 
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perceived as laborious, demanding, time-consuming and rather ineffective 
(Lepistö, 2008; Lepistö & Hänninen, 2011). 
Enforcement measures appear to be a necessary control measure for 
eliminating health hazards in food business operations, as the measures are 
especially used when an FBO has multiple or severe non-compliances recorded 
as contributing or risk factors for foodborne illnesses (Lundén, 2013). 
However, Lepistö (2008) noted that poor knowledge and uncertainty in 
municipal control units have limited the use of enforcement measures and 
even resulted in disuse or passive authority. According to the audits of local 
food control conducted by Regional State Administrative Agencies, the use of 
enforcement measures has been insufficient (Evira, 2014b).  
Noticeable differences and shortcomings among the local food control 
units have been reported in administrative practices, protecting legal rights 
and realization of the principles of good governance (Lepistö, 2008). Major 
deficiencies were observed in the hearing process, presenting legal arguments 
for decisions and providing directions for appeals (Lepistö, 2008). Also among 
official veterinarians in slaughterhouses, the veterinarians in slaughterhouses 
showing severe non-compliances seem to have less expertise in administrative 
procedures than their peers in other slaughterhouses (Luukkanen & Lundén, 
2016). As concluded by Lepistö (2008), good governance affects the 
elimination of health hazards and the efficacy of enforcement measures and 
control in general. Deficiencies in the administrative formalities, such as the 
hearing process or legal argumentation of the decisions, are likely reasons for 
repeal of the decision in the appellate courts, which may endanger or prolong 
the removal of health hazards (Lepistö, 2008).  
To develop the administrative procedure and expertise of officials, uniform 
guidelines, support and encouragement from the central authority, templates 
and judicial aid are required (Lepistö & Hänninen, 2011; Luukkanen & 
Lundén, 2016). The positive impacts of increased guidance on the use of 
enforcement measures have been noted in EU member states (COM, 2013). In 
Finland, Evira has provided a national guideline for using enforcement 
measures (Evira, 2012a) as well as templates for the enforcement decisions 
available for food control officials. Despite these improvements and enhanced 
guidance, a recent report of private pilot audits of environmental health and 
food control units indicates that the culture of control varies between the units 
from an advisory and negotiative approach to firm and rapid authoritative 
activity, and differences in the use of enforcement measures and certain 
shortcomings in the practices were still observed (Lepistö, 2016).   
The findings of previous studies have indicated a need for further research 
on the use of enforcement measures and related challenges. Particularly, the 
efficacy of enforcement procedures in inducing compliance and the durations 
of the procedures remain unknown. Moreover, the factors affecting whether 
enforcement measures are used or not warrant investigation.  
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 DISCLOSURE OF FOOD CONTROL INFORMATION 
2.6.3.1 Benefits and challenges of publishing control information  
Publishing the inspection reports of food premises aims at increasing the 
efficacy of enforcement by enhancing the incentives of FBOs to comply (Ho, 
2012; Djekic et al., 2014; Evira, 2015b; da Cunha et al., 2016a). Disclosing the 
inspection reports at the food premises and/or on the internet showing grades 
or scores is the choice of several countries and large cities, e.g. Denmark 
(Danish Veterinary and Food Administration [DVFA], 2015), UK (Worsfold & 
Worsfold, 2008; Food Standards Agency of United Kingdom [FSA UK], 
2017a), Toronto (Thompson et al., 2005) and New York (New York City, 2017). 
Among food services, the public posting of inspection results has been 
reported to promote food safety and compliance (Jin & Leslie 2003; Simon et 
al., 2005; Thompson et al., 2005; Serapiglia et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2015).  
Disclosure of inspection results is considered to enhance transparency of 
official control and food business and to be an effective means of 
communicating food safety risks to consumers (Filion & Powell, 2009; Ho, 
2012; Papadopoulos et al., 2012; Evira, 2013, 2015b; Djekic et al., 2014; da 
Cunha et al., 2016a). For instance, in Denmark, consumers are very familiar 
with the grading scheme, “Smiley” (DVFA, 2015). However, studies in other 
countries have reported less awareness and influence of the grading systems 
among consumers (Shahid & Whisson, 2012). Moreover, although one core 
aim of the disclosure systems is to harmonize the inspection practices 
(Thompson et al., 2005; Evira, 2013, 2015b), variation in grading between 
authorities is a challenge (Worsfold & Worsfold, 2007; Ho, 2012).  
Some countries also publish other enforcement information alongside 
inspection results. For instance, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) 
maintains a public online database for enforcement order reports and 
successful prosecutions (FSAI, 2017). The database is updated every working 
day and includes closure, improvement and prohibition orders issued to FBOs, 
and the reports remain in the website for a period of one to three months from 
the date the order was lifted (FSAI, 2017). Also the FSA UK publishes an online 
register for successful food law prosecution outcomes acquired by the FSA UK 
and local food authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FSA UK, 
2017b).  
2.6.3.2 Finnish Oiva evaluation system 
Based on the obligation of FBOs and control authorities to disclose the 
document on the inspection of the food premises set in the Finnish Food Act 
(MAF, 2011b), a national system for publishing the inspection reports (Oiva 
evaluation system) has been adopted since 2013 in the retail sector and since 
2015 in all food business industries in Finland (Evira, 2013). The Oiva 
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inspections are conducted based on standardized evaluation criteria covering 
widely food hygiene, information given about foods and traceability of food 
items. The criteria are separate for registered food premises, such as 
restaurants, retail stores or bakeries, and for approved food premises, 
including dairy, fishery and meat establishments. The structure and layout of 
the Oiva report are standardized across the country (Evira, 2013). According 
to the order given by Evira, retail FBOs are obliged to publish the Oiva 
inspection report at the entrance of the food premises or in other place easily 
accessible to customers, and all food companies must publish the report on 
their web page if they market foodstuff via webpages (Evira, 2016b). The 
evaluation criteria, inspection guidelines and Oiva inspection reports are 
publically available for FBOs and consumers and published online (Evira, 
2017e).  
For each inspected item, based on the severity and recurrence of the 
observed food safety violation, the evaluation criteria define the Oiva grade to 
be given and determine the control actions that the food control officials 
should take (Evira, 2013). Smiley grades, ranging from A (“excellent”), B 
(“good”), C (“to be corrected”) to D (“poor”), are used to indicate the inspection 
result for each inspected item, and the lowest grade of all inspected areas 
determines the overall grade for the inspection (Evira, 2013). Since 
introduction of the Oiva system, the vast majority of all inspected FBOs have 
been given a grade A or B, in 2016 the combined share of the best grades (A + 
B) being 86% (Evira, 2017e).  
One aim of the Oiva system is to improve the efficacy and risk-basis of 
inspections (Evira, 2015b). According to the evaluation guidelines, food 
control authorities should always initiate an administrative enforcement 
process if the FBO is given a grade D, indicating that food safety is jeopardized 
or the consumer is being considerably misled (Evira, 2016d). Also if the non-
compliance impairs food safety or misleads the consumer (grade C) and if 
other control measures are inadequate, or if the non-compliance is recurrent, 
administrative enforcement measures should be used (Evira, 2016d). 
Thus far, only a few studies have investigated the Oiva evaluation system. 
Hallberg (2016) reports that the Oiva system is not very well known among 
consumers, and thus, the system has little influence on consumer’s choice of 
retail store. Juppi (2015) concludes that although the food control officials and 
retail FBOs consider that the Oiva system standardizes inspections and 
enhances correction of violations, further harmonization of the practices, 
improved clarity of evaluation guidelines and consumer familiarity with the 
system are needed.  
No scientific literature about the applicability of the disclosure systems 
from the viewpoint of FBOs in approved establishments before retail stage 
exists. Furthermore, previous studies in Finland discussing the opinions of 
FBOs regarding the official food control (Tähkäpää et al., 2009a; Nevas et al., 
2013, Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b; Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015) were conducted 
before introducing the Oiva system. It is thus unknown whether the changes 
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in the control system in the form of harmonized guidelines and publication of 
inspection results have influenced the views of FBOs on the importance and 
consistency of official food control overall. In addition, the influence of the 
Oiva evaluation system on the use of administrative enforcement measures 
has not been investigated.  
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3 AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The principal objective of this study was to investigate the risk-basis, efficacy 
and consistency of enforcement of food safety legislation at the local level in 
Finland. The topic was examined by exploring the views and control actions of 
food control officials and by surveying the perceptions of FBOs. The study aims 
at discovering ways to improve the risk-basis, efficacy and consistency of 
enforcement practices. 
 
Specific aims of the study were as follows: 
 
1. To analyse the risk-basis of enforcement by examining how the types of 
food safety violations and the control history of FBOs affect the use of 
administrative enforcement measures in local food control units (I, III) 
 
2. To evaluate the efficacy of using administrative enforcement measures 
in the units by investigating the correction of violations and durations 
of enforcement processes (I).  
 
3. To explore factors affecting and challenging the use of administrative 
enforcement measures in local food control units (II, III).  
 
4. To investigate the perceptions of Finnish FBOs of approved dairy, 
fishery and meat establishments under municipal food control 
regarding the importance of official control for the food safety of their 
company and how they experience the consistency of official food 
control (IV). 
 
5. To assess preliminary effects of the Oiva evaluation system on the use 
of administrative enforcement measures (III) and to explore how the 
FBOs in approved establishments perceive the system in its early stages 
(IV).  
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4 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The material of the study consisted of analysis of administrative enforcement 
decisions and related documents by local food control authorities (I), survey 
(II, III) and interviews (III) of local food control officials on the use of 
administrative enforcement measures and related challenges, analysis of 
inspection reports of retail and food-serving FBOs (III) and surveys to FBOs 
in approved dairy, fishery and meat establishments under municipal food 
control (IV). Both quantitative and qualitative data analysis methods were 
used. 
 
4.1 ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS (I) 
Administrative enforcement decisions and related documents from January 
2008 to September 2011 were requested from 29 selected units, representing 
34% of the units at that time, in September 2011. The sample included the 
largest units, based on the number of inhabitants, and randomly chosen 
smaller units to cover all regions of the six Regional State Administrative 
Agencies. Enforcement cases (n = 188) from 19 units were analysed; 10 of the 
sample units had not used enforcement measures during the study period. 
Data concerning the labour resources of the units and the number of food 
premises in the area of the units were collected from an Evira report (Evira, 
2011). 
Each enforcement case, including one to several violations, was analysed to 
determine the type of violations within the cases, whether compliance was 
achieved, persistence of violations before initiation of the enforcement process 
in days (pre-enforcement process), duration of the enforcement process in 
days, which enforcement measures had been used and whether enforcement 
measures were recurrently used due to repeated violations. The duration of 
the pre-enforcement process was counted from the date the authority detected 
the violation to the date the FBO was heard of a prospective enforcement 
decision, and the enforcement process from the date of hearing to the date 
compliance was verified.  
 
 44 
 
4.2 ELECTRONIC QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOOD 
CONTROL OFFICIALS AND HEADS OF THE UNITS 
(II, III) 
An electronic questionnaire (E-lomake, Eduix Oy) was developed and sent to 
all units (n = 62), excluding the autonomous region of Åland, in September 
2015 (II, III). The head of the unit and officials conducting food inspections 
(henceforth “inspectors”) received partly tailored versions of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was mainly structured, consisting of a four-
point Likert scale and other closed questions about whether enforcement 
measures had been used in their unit within the last three years and the 
opinions of respondents about enforcement measures, adequacy of available 
training, quality of national guidance, consistency in the use of enforcement 
measures and the expertise of both themselves and the head of their unit (II). 
Respondents were also asked about delegation of authority regarding the use 
of enforcement measures and whether their unit has an internal guideline and 
templates for enforcement decisions (II). In addition, the respondents were 
asked about their opinions of the influence of the Oiva evaluation system on 
the use of enforcement measures (III). The respondents could also elaborate 
on their answers in two specified open-ended questions: 1) “Is there something 
you perceive as problematic, difficult or laborious in the use of enforcement 
measures?” and 2) “You may freely express your opinions about enforcement 
measures.” (II) and in general open-ended questions (“Other, please specify”) 
subsequent to closed questions regarding the Oiva system (III). If not 
indicated in the survey, the data concerning the labour resources of the units 
and the number of food premises in the areas of units were collected from the 
internet pages of the units (II).  
 
4.3 OIVA INSPECTION REPORTS (III) 
Within the control areas of the 45 units that participated in the electronic 
survey (II, III), the national food control database was searched to find the 
food serving and/or preparing premises and retail stores for which there was 
no record on using enforcement measures despite a given grade D in 2014. The 
sample included a total of 75 food premises located within the areas of 15 units. 
For these food premises, the Oiva inspection reports (n = 305) from May 2013 
until December 2015 were collected from the database.  
 
4.4 INTERVIEWS OF FOOD CONTROL OFFICIALS (III) 
To uncover factors related to control history of the FBO and alignments in the 
units that may have influenced using or not using enforcement measures in 
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the cases of the 75 FBOs given a grade D in 2014, a semi-structured interview 
form was developed. Between December 2015 and March 2016, telephone 
interviews were conducted with the officials who had inspected these FBOs. A 
total of 42 officials, ranging from 1 to 7 per unit, were interviewed. Of these, 18 
had inspected more than one of the sample food premises. In five cases, the 
official who had conducted the control actions was not available for interview 
and a colleague or superior was interviewed instead. 
During the interviews the officials were asked whether enforcement 
measures had been used in the cases, and if not, why.  The interviewees were 
also inquired about alignments in their unit regarding the use of enforcement 
measures if a grade D is given to a FBO. The questions comprised multiple 
choice and open questions. The officials were grouped according to their units. 
 
4.5 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FBOS (IV) 
A structured questionnaire was developed on the basis of a form used in 
restaurant business operator interviews by Läikkö-Roto and Nevas (2014b) 
and sent to all approved meat, fishery and dairy product establishments under 
municipal food control in Finland, excluding the establishments located in the 
autonomous region of Åland. The survey was carried out between October 
2015 and February 2016. The list of the establishments was acquired from the 
public register of Evira (Evira, 2015a), and the number of establishments 
receiving the questionnaire was 630. The inquiry was sent as an electronic 
questionnaire (E-lomake, Eduix Oy) (n = 333) or as a printed version (n = 
297), depending on the public availability of e-mail addresses of the 
companies. The e-mail addresses of the FBOs of approved establishments 
were obtained from the internet, or if no e-mail addresses were found, the 
postal addresses of the companies were acquired from the Evira register 
(Evira, 2015a). 
The questionnaire inquired about the opinions of FBOs regarding the 
importance and consistency of official food control, relevance and efficacy of 
official control actions, optimal inspection frequency and quality of 
inspections. In addition, the perceptions of FBOs regarding the interaction 
with the official and their views of the Oiva evaluation system were of interest. 
The majority of the questions were closed questions for which respondents 
were asked to choose from a fixed number of given options or state their 
opinion to given claims in a five-point Likert scale. In evaluating the hygiene 
status of their establishment and the quality of official food control, FBOs used 
Finnish school grades (4 = fail, 5 = poor, 6 = fair, 7 = satisfactory, 8 = good, 9 
= very good, 10 = excellent). Three open-ended questions allowed the 
respondents to state their opinions of the topics of the survey and to elaborate 
on their answers: 1) “What does uniformity of official control mean in your 
opinion?”, 2) “What kind of thoughts, hopes or fears does the Oiva evaluation 
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system evoke in you?” and 3) “You may freely express your opinions about 
uniformity and efficacy of official food control”.  
 
4.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Statistical analysis of the data was carried out using SPSS Statistics (IBM SPPS 
Statistics, NY, USA) v. 20.0 (I) or v. 22.0 (II-IV). Non-parametric tests were 
applied as the variables included in the analyses appeared not to be normally 
distributed according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, many variables were 
discrete and the sample sizes were rather small in some analyses. In the 
statistical analyses of the survey responses (II-IV), the “I don’t know” answers 
were categorized as missing. In counting the durations of enforcement 
processes (I), deficient information of outcome was defined as missing. 
Cronbach’s alpha was used to examine the reliability of the created sum 
variables in Study IV. Statistical significance was accepted at two-tailed p-
values < 0.05. 
 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS (I) 
Violations (n = 541) were categorized as critical (n = 236) or non-critical (n = 
305) based on studies on the likelihood of food safety violations directly 
contributing to food contamination or foodborne outbreaks (Jones et al., 
2004; Reske et al., 2007; Evira, 2012b; US FDA, 2013). Critically defined 
violations comprised six categories: traceability, temperature control, 
cleanliness of equipment or surface in contact with food, operational or 
personal hygiene, hand-washing and personal hygiene facilities, and food 
quality and safety. The durations of pre-enforcement and enforcement 
processes were analysed according to each violation within a case. Differences 
between critical and non-critical violations in pre-enforcement and 
enforcement process durations were analysed by using a Mann-Whitney U 
test. Spearman’s rho was used to analyse the correlations between the number 
of enforcement cases and the labour resources of the unit and the number of 
food premises in the areas of the units. 
 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA ON QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
FOOD CONTROL OFFICIALS (II, III) 
The respondents were grouped into the heads of the unit and inspectors, and 
the inspectors were further stratified based on whether they had initiated 
enforcement processes themselves within the last three years or not 
(henceforth “enforcer inspectors” and “non-enforcer inspectors”). 
Categorization at the unit level was made based on the use of enforcement 
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measures within the last three years (henceforth “enforcer units” and “non-
enforcer units”) and number of labour resources of the unit (small unit = 
resources equal to or less than the median of the responding units; large unit 
= resources greater than said median).  
To compare the units based on their prerequisites for using enforcement 
measures, the units were scored on six factors: 1) existence of an internal 
guideline for the use of enforcement measures, 2) availability of templates for 
enforcement decisions, 3) availability of templates for urgent enforcement 
measures, 4) whether enforcement measures are discussed in meetings or 
otherwise in the unit, 5) participation of at least one of the respondents of the 
unit in training related to the use of enforcement measures and 6) delegation 
of authority to use enforcement measures from the municipal organ to the 
head of the unit and/or to the inspectors. One point was gained for each factor 
existing in the unit, and the mean of the total points of the unit formed the 
final scores for each unit. Units without valid information for at least half of 
the factors were excluded from scoring. A two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test was 
conducted to analyse the differences between enforcer and non-enforcer units 
and between large and small units in scoring, labour resources and number of 
food premises. Kruskal-Wallis test was used to analyse regional differences 
among the units in the scoring. Comparison of groups with nominal variables 
was conducted by using Fisher’s exact test.  
 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA ON OIVA INSPECTION 
REPORTS (III) 
Based on Oiva evaluation guidelines for notified food premises (Evira, 2016d), 
the D-graded non-compliances recorded in the inspection reports were 
categorized into 17 main categories. Fisher’s exact test was used to compare 
the compliance history of the FBOs between cases based on whether or not an 
enforcement process was initiated.  
 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA ON QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
FBOS (IV) 
The responding establishments were categorized based on main type of 
production and their regional location. For comparision of the establishments 
based on size, the establishments were categorized into micro- (< 10 
employees), small- (10 - 49 employees), medium- (50 - 249 employees) and 
large-sized (≥ 250 employees) enterprises. Two sum variables were created to 
compare the FBOs’ opinions of 1) the hygiene status of their establishment and 
2) the quality of official food control. The first sum variable (n of variables = 5, 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.874) consisted of the grades given by FBOs to 1) 
operational hygiene, 2) compliance with legislation, 3) safety of the foods 
manufactured, 4) willingness to correct food safety violations and 5) overall 
food hygiene of their establishment. The second sum variable (n of variables = 
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6, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.959) consisted of the grades given by FBOs to 1) 
inspections, 2) guidance given by the official, 3) willingness of the official to 
negotiate, 4) inspection reports, 5) attitude of the official towards the 
establishment and 6) overall control of the establishment. Pearson Chi-square 
exact test was used to analyse the differences between establishments grouped 
by size, and the correlations between discrete and continuous variables were 
evaluated by using Spearman’s rho. Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to analyse 
the differences in the sum variables between establishments grouped by size 
and main type of production. 
 
4.7 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (II-IV) 
The qualitative data acquired from the responses to the open-ended questions 
in the surveys for food control officials (II, III) and FBOS (IV) were analysed 
by using content analysis, in which the data are systematically coded and 
categorized to identify themes and patterns (O’Cathain & Thomas, 2004; 
Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Vaismoradi et al., 2013). The 
steps of the analysis, including familiarization with the data, initial coding of 
the answers, devising the coding frame and generation of the themes, were 
manually conducted, utilizing Microsoft Excel 2013 software (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2012). 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON USE OF 
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES AND SURVEY 
RESPONDENTS (I-IV) 
 ENFORCEMENT CASES IN 2008–2011 (I) 
During 2008-2011, 66% (19/29) of the units involved in the study had used 
enforcement measures. In the units that used enforcement measures, the 
number of enforcement cases ranged from 1–113 cases per unit and 0.10–2.34 
cases per 100 food premises. No correlation was observed between the number 
of enforcement cases per unit and the number of food premises or the labour 
resources of the unit (Spearman’s rho p > 0.05). 
 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOOD CONTROL OFFICIALS (II, III) 
A total of 129 responses from 73% (45/62) of the units, from the regions of all 
six Regional State Administrative Agencies, were received. Of the respondents, 
28 (22%) were the heads of the unit and 101 (78 %) were inspectors (Table 3). 
In 87% (39/45) of the units, enforcement measures had been used in the last 
three years. The labour resources for performing official food control tasks in 
the responding units were higher in enforcer units than in non-enforcer units 
(Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.031) (Table 3). Also the number of food premises 
in the area of the unit was higher in enforcer units than in non-enforcer units 
(Table 3), but the difference was not significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 
0.092). Of the inspectors, 61% (62/101) had used enforcement measures 
themselves.
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Table 3. Background information of the units (n = 45) categorized according to whether 
enforcement measures had been used in the units during the last three years (II). 
One inspector did not indicate the applicable unit, and thus, it could not be 
categorized as an enforcer or non-enforcer unit. 
Factor related to the unit  Enforcer unit  
(n = 39) 
Non-enforcer 
unit (n = 6) 
Total 
Number of respondents 120 8 128 
 Inspectors 93 7 100 
 Heads 27 1 28 
Median of labour resources a for 
performing food control tasks [range] 
4.0 
[1.7 - 33.0] 
3.0 
[1.0 - 4.0] 
4.0  
[1.0 - 33.0] 
Median of number of food premises in 
the unit’s area b [range] 
845 
[180 - 5320] 
328  
[313 - 379] 
717 
[180 - 5320] 
Size of the unit categorized according to 
labour resources c 
   
 Small 17 5 22 
 Large 16 0 16 
a Data on labour resources were available for 38 units. 
b Data on number of food premises in the unit’s area were available for 37 units. 
c Small unit = labour resources equal to or less than the median (≤ 4 person-years); large unit = 
labour resources greater than the median (> 4 person-years). 
 
 D-GRADED CASES IN 2014 (III) 
Even though not reported in the national food control database, an 
enforcement process was actually initiated in 39% (29/75) of the D-graded 
cases as revealed by analysis of inspection reports and interviews of officials. 
In 61% (46/75) of the cases, no enforcement process was initiated. D-graded 
violations were observed in a total of 12 main categories of the inspected items. 
 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FBOS (IV) 
The survey yielded a total of 136 responses (response rate 22%), covering the 
areas of 79% of units and the regions of all six Regional State Administrative 
Agencies. The majority of the establishments of the responding FBOs were 
micro-sized, employing less than ten persons (Table 4). The proportions of the 
responding establishments, based on the main type of production and the 
regional distribution, corresponded well with the distribution of all 
establishments in Finland, based on the Evira register (Evira, 2015a). An Oiva 
inspection had been conducted in 73% (87/119) of the establishments. Based 
on the sum variable created for the hygiene status of their establishment, the 
mean grade of all establishments was 8.9 (range 7.0-10.0), and the mean 
grades given by dairy, fishery and meat establishments were 9.2, 8.8 and 9.0, 
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respectively (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.007). Among establishments grouped 
by size, no significant differences were observed in the mean grades of the sum 
variable created for the hygiene status. 
 
Table 4. Responding FBOs according to main type of production and size of establishment 
(IV). 
 Main type of production 
% of responding FBOs (n/N) 
 
Factor related to FBO Dairy  Fishery Meat Total  
All FBOs  18 (24/136) 47 (64/136) 35 (48/136) 100 (136/136) 
Size of establishment a     
 Micro (< 10 employees) 50 (12/24) 77 (46/60) 56 (27/48) 64 (85/132) 
 Small (10 - 49 employees) 8 (2/24) 15 (9/60) 19 (9/48) 15 (20/132) 
 Medium (50 - 249 
employees) 
25 (6/24) 8 (5/60) 21 (10/48) 16 (21/132) 
 Large (≥ 250 employees) 17 (4/24) 0 (0/60) 4 (2/48) 5 (6/132) 
a Four FBOs did not indicate the number of employees in their establishment. 
 
5.2 RISK-BASIS OF ENFORCEMENT (I, III, IV) 
 RISK-BASIS IN INITIATION OF AN ENFORCEMENT PROCESS (I, 
III) 
Of the enforcement cases during 2008-2011, 64% (120/188) had more than 
one violation and 79% (149/188) had critical violations (I). The most common 
violations mentioned in the enforcement decisions were related to 
infrastructure of the premises (42% of cases), traceability of foodstuff (36%), 
self-checking system (27%) or other non-compliance (36%) such as improper 
or misleading labelling.  
The most common enforcement measures used were an order (77%; 
414/541 of all violations) and a prohibition (41%; 222/541) (I). A prohibition 
was particularly often used in critical violations (56%; 132/236 of critical 
violations). In 8% (42/541) of all violations, a given order or prohibition was 
reinforced by imposing a threat of a penalty payment or suspension of 
operations.  
Analysis of the inspection reports of D-graded cases in 2014 indicated that 
37% (28/75) of the FBOs were given a grade D for more than one inspected 
items (III). The most commonly reported violations were related to 
temperature control and prevention of cross-contamination during 
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preparation and storage (37% of cases), temperature control and prevention 
of cross-contamination during serving and selling (29%) and self-checking 
plan (29%). Based on the analysis of the compliance history of the FBOs, 37% 
(28/75) had been given a prior grade C in 2014 for the same inspected items 
that were eventually given a grade D. Among the cases in which an 
enforcement process was initiated, the FBO had more than one D-graded 
violation in 59% (17/29) of cases and had been given a prior grade C for the 
same inspected items in 66% (19/29) of cases, while the corresponding 
proportions among cases in which an enforcement process was not initiated 
were 24% (11/46) and 20% (9/46) (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.003 and  
p < 0.001). Of the FBOs inspected based on the Oiva system in the previous 
year of 2013 (n = 23), 91% (21/23) had already then been given a grade C or D 
for the same or another inspected item that was graded D in 2014. 
The risk-based assessment was highlighted in the responses of the 
interviewed officials regarding the reasons for not using enforcement 
measures despite an assigned grade D (III). According to the officials, the non-
compliance was corrected during a set time limit in more than half of the cases 
(52%; 24/46) or already during the inspection visit (30%; 14/46). In 13% 
(6/46) of cases, the given reason was that the non-compliance did not 
jeopardize food safety, although graded as D. In almost one-third of the cases, 
more than one reason was given for not using enforcement measures. 
 NECESSITY AND RISK-BASIS OF OFFICIAL FOOD CONTROL IN 
THE OPINION OF FBOS (IV) 
Official food control was considered to be important for the food safety of their 
establishment in the opinion of 85% (112/132) of the responding FBOs and for 
their economic success in the opinion of 74% (96/129). A majority (82%; 
110/134) of the FBOs also considered that the official “always” or “most often” 
focuses on relevant subjects during the inspections. Of the small-sized FBOs, 
however, significantly lower numbers (50%; 10/20) were of this opinion 
(Pearson Chi-square exact test, p = 0.001). When requested their opinion of 
an optimal inspection frequency of their establishment, 53% (70/132) of all 
FBOs but 70% (14/20) of the small FBOs stated that it should be less frequent 
than the current one determined by the official. Moreover, only half of the 
FBOs agreed that official food control is risk-based or that the control actions 
were needed (Figure 1). Small-sized FBOs were particularly critical of the 
control actions being in line with the observed non-compliance, as only 47% 
(8/17) of them agreed with the claim. 
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Figure 1. Opinions of FBOs about official food control and its necessity, uniformity and 
efficacy (IV). 
* An asterisk indicates a significant difference in the share of the responses among 
FBOs grouped according to the size of the establishment (Pearson Chi-square 
exact test, p < 0.005).
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
I would willingly pay more for official control if I
could get more benefits from it (n = 121)
The benefit I get corresponds to the costs of
official control * (n =128)
Control actions have been effective * (n = 119)
Control actions have prevented future non-
compliance (n = 120)
Control actions have been needed (n = 129)
Official food control is risk-based (n = 122)
Control actions have been in line with observed
non-compliance * (n = 119)
I wish to negotiate more about the changes
required in our establishment * (n = 127)
I wish to receive more guidance from the official
(n = 133)
Similar non-compliance should always result in
similar control action, despite the FBO's control
history  (n = 128)
Official food control has been arbitrary * (n = 128)
Official food control is uniform (n = 127)
Official food control should be uniform (n = 134)
Fully or partly agree Neither agree nor disagree Fully or partly disagree
Claims concerning official  food control
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5.3 EFFICACY OF ENFORCEMENT (I-IV) 
 CORRECTION OF NON-COMPLIANCES (I-III) 
Based on the survey to food control officials (II), almost all officials perceived 
enforcement measures as necessary for food control (Figure 2), and 84% 
(35/42) of the enforcer inspectors “fully” or “partly” agreed that the use of 
enforcement measures had improved food safety in the food premises in which 
enforcement measures had been used. However, 43% (47/110) of the officials 
noted that enforcement measures may not be used in their unit often enough, 
and up to 58% (61/106) considered that food safety violations should be more 
often reported to the police (Figure 2). Of the respondents, 80% (97/121) 
stated that the enforcement procedure is too slow to ensure food safety and 
58% (71/123) agreed that the head of the unit should have the right to fine a 
FBO in case of severe food safety violations (Figure 2). However, only 41% 
(50/122) of the respondents agreed that the officials should have a right to 
impose an on-site fine during the inspection (Figure 2).  
Among the enforcement cases during 2008-2011 (I), the use of 
enforcement measures led to compliance or cessation of non-compliant 
operations in 87% (472/541) of the violations. In the rest of the violations, case 
resolution remained unclear or compliance was not achieved. All violations in 
which the given enforcement decision had been reinforced by imposing a 
threat of a penalty payment or suspension of operations resulted in 
compliance.  
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Figure 2. Opinions of food control officials (n = 129) on the use of enforcement measures in 
their unit, the enforcement procedure and the need for stricter control measures to 
intervene in food safety violations (II).   
Before using enforcement measures, the authority had issued the FBO a 
request to correct the detected violations more often in non-critical than in 
critical violations (Table 5) (I). The median duration of pre-enforcement 
processes was 14 days and that of enforcement processes 57 days, both being 
significantly shorter in critical violations than in non-critical violations (Table 
5). In 9% (43/469) of the violations, the enforcement process took more than 
one year. The median duration of enforcement process for violations in which 
the given decision was reinforced with a penalty payment or a threat of 
suspension was substantially longer (116 days) than the median of all 
violations (57 days). 
 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Using enforcement measures is laborious and time-
consuming (n = 124)
Enforcement processes are too slow for ensuring food
safety (n = 121)
Lawyers acquainted with food legislation are needed in our
unit (n = 119)
Enforcement measures are difficult to implement (n = 124)
Food control authorities should more often report food
safety violations to the police (n = 106)
The head of the control unit should be able to give the FBO
a fine if severe food safety violations are observed (n = 123)
The document management systems of our control unit are
easy to use (n = 113)
Enforcement measures are not used often enough in our
unit to ensure food safety (n = 110)
Food control officials should be able to give the FBO a fine
during the inspection if severe food safety violations are
observed ( n = 122)
Enforcement measures are unnecessary (n = 126)
Fully agree Partly agree Partly disagree Fully disagree
Claim regarding the use of enforcement measures
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Table 5.  Durations of the pre-enforcement and enforcement processes and the proportion 
of violations with a preceding request to correct them before initiating an 
enforcement process in critical and non-critical violations (I).  
Factor related to the process All violations Critical 
violations a 
Non-critical 
violations  
Median duration of pre-enforcement 
process in days [range] 
14  
[0, 1848] 
7 A 
[0, 1848] 
30 B 
[0, 1848] 
Median duration of enforcement 
process in days [range] 
57  
[1, 1083] 
41 A  
[1, 1083] 
84 B 
[1, 1083] 
Preceding request to correct 
violations before initiating an 
enforcement process had been given 
in % of violations (n/N) 
65 (353/541) 52 (123/236) 75 (230/305) 
a Violations categorized as critical were related to traceability, temperature control, cleanliness of 
equipment or surface in contact with food, operational or personal hygiene, hand-washing and 
personal hygiene facilities, and food quality and safety. 
A, B Different capital letters indicate a significant difference between critical and non-critical 
violations (Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.001). 
 
 
Recurrent use of enforcement measures due to repeated violations was 
needed in 16% (85/541) of the violations, which were most commonly 
categorized as non-critical, e.g. deficiencies in self-checking systems, 
infrastructure or other non-compliance such as improper labelling (I). The 
authority reported food regulation offences to the police in 6% (12/188) of all 
cases. Of these cases, 67% (8/12) resulted in a fine given to the FBO and 8% 
(1/12) in a fine with conditional imprisonment. In the rest of the reported 
cases, the outcome of the investigation was unclear or the investigation was 
unfinished. 
Among the D-graded cases in 2014 (III), the FBOs corrected the D-graded 
non-compliances already during the inspection visit in 19% (14/75) of the 
cases and by the end of 2015 at the latest in 64% (48/75) of the cases. In the 
rest of the cases, the FBO changed or ceased the operations (12%; 9/75) or the 
non-compliances were not corrected during the study period (5%; 4/75). If not 
corrected during the inspection but corrected by the end of 2015, the non-
compliances were corrected by the first follow-up inspection in 63% (30/48) 
of the cases. In the remaining cases, two to five follow-up inspections were 
required. When an enforcement process was initiated (n = 29), the non-
compliances were corrected or the FBO ceased the operations already during 
the hearing process in 45% (13/29) of the cases. 
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 INFLUENCE OF OFFICIAL FOOD CONTROL ON OPERATIONS 
OF FBOS (IV) 
When asked about their opinions of the influence of official food control on the 
hygiene in their establishment, 67% (82/122) of the FBOs stated that the food 
control official noted relevant food safety issues and the establishment 
corrected the operations significantly or to some extent. According to nearly 
all of the responding FBOs (95%; 127/133), the official “always” or “most 
often” ensures that food safety violations are corrected, and for 79% (103/130) 
of the FBOs, time limits for correction of violations had been set. No significant 
differences in these responses occurred between establishments grouped by 
size or main type of production. However, only slightly over half of the FBOs 
considered that the control actions have been effective, and even fewer 
perceived that the received benefits correspond to its costs (Figure 1). Among 
the responses regarding the efficacy of control actions and the benefits of 
official food control, significant differences were observed among FBOs 
grouped by the size of establishments (Pearson Chi-square exact test,  
p < 0.005) (Figure 1). Small-sized FBOs were particularly pessimistic about 
these topics, as only 28% (5/18) agreed that the control actions have been 
effective, and 55% (11/20) disagreed that the benefits received correspond to 
the costs of official control. The means of the sum variable created for the 
school grades given by the FBOs to the quality of official food control were also 
lower among small FBOs than among other establishments (Kruskal-Wallis 
test, p = 0.033). The means of the sum variable correlated positively with the 
opinions of FBOs on whether the control actions of the official had been 
needed, effective or prevented future non-compliance (Spearman’s rho, r = 
0.421, p < 0.001; r = 0.581, p < 0.001; and r = 0.472, p < 0.001, respectively).  
Of the FBOs, 66% (78/118) considered that a good hygiene level resulting 
in reduction of control fees of the establishment would “very positively” or 
“somewhat positively” influence hygiene maintenance. 
 
5.4 CONSISTENCY OF ENFORCEMENT (II-IV) 
 PRACTICAL PREREQUISITES AND ROUTINE FOR USING 
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES IN THE UNITS (II, III) 
Based on survey responses, enforcer units had significantly higher scores 
(median 0.67, mean 0.71, range 0.17-1.00) than non-enforcer units (median 
0.33, mean 0.37, range 0.20-0.50) (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.001) (II). The 
scores were also significantly higher in large units (median 0.83, mean 0.82, 
range 0.17-1.00) than in small units (median 0.50, mean 0.58, range 0.17-
1.00) (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.002). The scores of the units did not differ 
regionally (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.696). Of the sole factors used in scoring 
the units, an internal guideline and templates for enforcement decisions and 
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urgent enforcement measures existed significantly more often in large units 
than in small units (Figure 3). In the enforcer units, all factors existed more 
often than in non-enforcer units, although the differences were not statistically 
significant (Figure 3). However, certain practical tools needed for the use of 
enforcement measures were also lacking in many enforcer units (Figure 3), 
and up to 40% (40/100) of the respondents of enforcer units perceived their 
unit not to have routine practices in the use of enforcement measures. Judicial 
assistance for the use of enforcement measures was available in 54% (15/28) 
of the units, based on the responses of the heads of the units. All of these units 
were enforcer units.  
Also the interviews of the officials revealed variation and discrepancies in 
responses regarding practices and policies; for instance, in 33% (5/15) of the 
units, the officials provided inconsistent opinions on whether or not their unit 
has a guideline for the use of enforcement measures (III). When asked about 
their views on the common policy in their unit regarding the use of Oiva grades 
and enforcement measures, 11/36 interviewed officials in 8/15 units stated 
that a grade C may be given one to three times before giving a grade D and 
initiating an enforcement process. In six units, at least one official mentioned 
that the grade and the initiation of an enforcement process are deliberated 
case-dependently, and in five units, that their unit has no joint policy on the 
subject. In four units, some of the answers indicated that giving a grade D may 
be avoided to circumvent the use of enforcement measures. In one unit, 
however, all three interviewed officials emphasized the clear practices and 
experience of the head and officials of their unit in using enforcement 
measures.  
   
59 
 
Fi
gu
re
 3
. 
E
xi
st
en
ce
 o
f f
ac
to
rs
 re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 th
e 
lo
ca
l f
oo
d 
co
nt
ro
l u
ni
ts
 u
se
d 
in
 s
co
rin
g 
th
e 
un
its
, g
ro
up
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 th
e 
la
st
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
an
d 
si
ze
 o
f t
he
 u
ni
ts
 (I
I).
  
 
A,
 B
 D
iff
e
re
n
t 
le
tt
e
rs
 in
d
ic
a
te
 a
 s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t 
d
iff
e
re
n
ce
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 la
rg
e
 a
n
d
 s
m
a
ll 
u
n
its
 (
F
is
h
e
r’
s 
e
xa
ct
 t
e
st
, p
 <
 0
.0
05
). 
 60 
 
 EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE OF OFFICIALS IN USING 
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES (II) 
Most officials agreed that the enforcement procedure is laborious, and many 
stated that using enforcement measures is difficult (Figure 2). The 
arduousness of the process and uncertainty in the use of enforcement 
measures arose as themes also in the content analysis of the answers to two 
open-ended questions regarding the use of enforcement measures and related 
challenges (Table 6). 
Of the inspectors, the majority perceived their own knowledge of food 
hygiene and safety (87%; 85/98) and food safety legislation (88%; 85/97) as 
adequate for the use of enforcement measures. However, expertise in 
administrative procedures and certainty in using enforcement measures 
appeared to be perceived as somewhat lower by non-enforcer than enforcer 
inspectors. Of enforcer inspectors, 82% (51/62) “fully” or “partly” agreed that 
they have sufficient knowledge of administrative procedures, and 89% (55/62) 
“fully” or “partly” agreed that it is clear to them when using enforcement 
measures is reasonable. By contrast, the corresponding proportions among 
non-enforcer inspectors were 64% (23/36) and 74% (26/35), although the 
differences between enforcer and non-enforcer inspectors did not reach 
statistical significance (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.053 and p = 0.088, 
respectively).  
The vast majority of all inspectors (92%; 87/95) “fully” or “partly” agreed 
that they would get support from the head of their unit in using enforcement 
measures. However, the inspectors of enforcer units assessed the expertise of 
the head of their unit considerably more positively than did the inspectors of 
non-enforcer units. In the opinion of the inspectors of enforcer units, the head 
of their unit has sufficient knowledge of food hygiene and safety (97%; 83/86), 
food safety legislation (95%; 81/85) and administrative processes (99%; 
85/86). Among the inspectors of non-enforcer units, the corresponding shares 
of these three sectors were 14% (1/7), 33% (2/6) and 43% (3/7) (Fisher’s exact 
test, p < 0.001, p < 0.001 and p = 0.010, respectively).  
Among the inspectors, a significant difference was observed in 
participation in training related to the use of enforcement measures; 77% 
(47/61) of the enforcer inspectors, but only 39% (14/36) of the non-enforcer 
inspectors had participated in training within the last five years (Fisher's exact 
test, p < 0.001). Of all officials, only 44% (49/112) considered available 
training for the use of enforcement measures to be sufficient. Moreover, only 
52% (34/65) of the officials who had utilized the guideline provided by Evira 
considered the guideline as "very" or "quite" useful in practice.  
 
 61 
 
Table 6. Themes and subcategories that emerged in the content analysis of the answers 
(n = 73) of food control officials regarding the use of enforcement measures, the 
enforcement process and related challenges, based on the two open-ended 
questions: “Is there something you perceive as problematic, difficult or laborious 
in the use of enforcement measures?” and “You may freely express your opinions 
about enforcement measures.” (II). 
Theme Subcategories within the theme (frequency) 
  
Necessity of enforcement measures Enforcement measures are important to official 
food control (12) 
 Enforcement measures are sometimes “the only 
choice” (2) 
Inefficiency of the process The process is slow (14) 
 Negotiation and discussion are preferable (10) 
 Lack of substantial consequences to a non-
compliant FBO (7) 
 Fining the FBO should be considered an  
option (5) 
 Using enforcement measures only as a last  
means (2) 
Arduousness of the procedure The administrative process is laborious and 
complex (26) 
 The process is time-consuming (14)  
Uncertainty in the use of enforcement 
measures 
Formulating and reasoning of the decisions (19) 
Lack of routine and common practices (17) 
 Need for more guidelines and training with a 
practical approach (10) 
 Deciding which situations warrant an enforcement 
measure and which measures should be used (10) 
FBO-related challenges FBO's lack of understanding of the enforcement 
decision, poor attitude towards compliance or 
inadequate knowledge of food safety (12) 
 Difficulties in delivering the decision to the FBO (4) 
 Language or cultural barrier (4) 
 
 OFFICIAL-FBO INTERACTION INFLUENCING THE EXPERIENCE 
OF ENFORCEMENT (II-IV) 
The expertise of the official was considered to be sufficient in the opinion of 
71% (89/126) of the responding FBOs, and 64% (82/129) of the FBOs thought 
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that the official was adequately conversant with the operations of the 
establishment (IV). Moreover, 94% (120/128) of the FBOs stated that high-
quality guidance given by the official has a “very positive” or “somewhat 
positive” influence on maintenance of the hygiene level of their establishment. 
Of the FBOs, 60% (79/132) “always” or “most often” contacted the official 
when they needed advice on food hygiene issues. Although only one-third of 
all FBOs wished to negotiate more with the official about the changes required 
in their establishments (Figure 1), up to 67% (12/18) of the small-sized FBOs 
wished for more negotiation. 
A majority of the FBOs (81%; 109/134) perceived the co-operation with the 
official as “very good” or “good”, whereas 16% (22/134) considered it to be 
“neutral” and 2% (3/134) “poor” or “very poor”. FBOs’ perceptions of the co-
operation correlated positively with the means of the sum variable created for 
the school grades given for official food control (Spearman’s rho, r = 0.601, p 
<0.001). In addition, the views on co-operation correlated positively with the 
perceptions of the control measures being in line with observed non-
compliance, being effective and yielding a good cost/benefit ratio (Spearman’s 
rho, r = 0.580, p < 0.001; r = 0.398, p <0.001; r = 0.409; p < 0.001). Moreover, 
the perceptions of co-operation correlated negatively with the opinions of 
FBOs on whether official food control has been arbitrary (Spearman’s rho, r = 
−0.492, p <0.001). Among the FBOs who saw the co-operation as “very good” 
or “good”, 92% (99/108) stated that the food control official focuses on 
relevant subjects during the inspections and 53% (57/107) considered the 
optimal inspection frequency to be the same as or more frequent than the 
current one, while the corresponding shares among the FBOs perceiving the 
co-operation as “very poor”, “poor” or “neutral” were 40% (10/25) and 21% 
(5/24) (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001 and p = 0.006, respectively).  
According to the responding officials (II), 79% (27/34) of the non-enforcer 
inspectors “fully” or “partly” agreed that using enforcement measures would 
impair the co-operation between the inspector and the FBO, compared with 
56% (33/56) of enforcer inspectors (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.026). FBO-
related reasons also emerged as a theme in the open answers (Table 6). In the 
interviews of the officials (III), a co-operative attitude of the FBO or attempts 
to comply were also mentioned by a few officials as reasons for preferring 
negotiation instead of using enforcement measures.  
 INFLUENCE OF OIVA EVALUATION GUIDELINES ON USE OF 
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES (III)  
Most officials responding to the questionnaire perceived that the Oiva 
evaluation guidelines provide unambiguous criteria for using enforcement 
measures (69%; 87/126) and enable better prerequisites for consistent use of 
enforcement measures within their unit (76%; 88/116) and between the units 
(71%; 85/119). Of the officials from enforcer units, 49% (55/113) thought that 
the Oiva system has “clearly” or “somewhat” lowered the threshold for using 
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enforcement measures in their unit, 45% (51/113) perceived no change and 6% 
(7/113) perceived the threshold to have “clearly” or “somewhat” risen.  
The Oiva system clarifying the criteria for initiation of an enforcement 
measures was also noted by seven officials in the elaborating open comments 
(n = 17). However, differing policies between the units were stressed by three 
respondents, and two stated that consistency within the unit depends not on 
the Oiva system but on the practices of the unit. Furthermore, discretion on a 
case-dependent basis and always taking into account the nature of the non-
compliance was emphasized by four respondents who stated that giving a 
grade D does not automatically require the use of enforcement measures. 
Moreover, publication of inspection results was perceived to enhance the 
correction of non-compliances, thus decreasing the need for using 
enforcement measures, according to two officials.  
Figure 4 summarizes the factors influencing the use of enforcement 
measures and is based on Studies II and III.
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 CONCERNS OF FBOS REGARDING THE CONSISTENCY OF 
CONTROL AND THE OIVA SYSTEM (IV) 
Nearly all (90%; 121/134) of the responding FBOs agreed that official food 
control should be uniform. However, only 36% of the FBOs considered it to be 
such, and 23% stated that official food control has been arbitrary (Figure 1). 
Of the small-sized FBOs, 47% (9/19) perceived the control to be arbitrary. In 
their answers to two open-ended questions (n = 72), the FBOs defined 
uniformity of official food control to mean similar rules, requirements and 
instructions for all FBOs (n = 39) and “consistent treatment” despite the 
location of the establishment (n = 27) or the interpretation of the official (n = 
20). On the other hand, taking the size of the establishment and the nature of 
its operations better into account in, for instance, risk assessment, control fees 
and sampling requirements, was mentioned in 24 answers.  
The attitude of most responding FBOs towards the Oiva system was 
positive (42%; 51/121) or neutral (31%; 38/121), but 26% (32/121) reported a 
negative attitude. Only 57% (64/113) of the FBOs “fully” or “partly” agreed that 
the Oiva system increases uniformity of official food control, but up to 41% 
(45/109) “fully” or “partly” agreed that the Oiva system makes official food 
control stricter than before. Moreover, among the establishments that had 
been inspected according to the Oiva system (n = 87), only 24% (19/78) 
believed that the Oiva system would enhance the correction of violations in 
their establishment. Less than half (49%; 35/71) of the FBOs in this group of 
respondents believed that the Oiva grades matter to their customers, and an 
even smaller proportion (34%; 24/70) considered the grades to be important 
when choosing their suppliers or subcontractors.  
A positive aspect is that 63% (49/79) of the FBOs with experience of the 
Oiva system agreed that the publicly available Oiva evaluation criteria disclose 
the issues that are the focus of the food control official during inspections and 
reveal how the observed violations are graded. However, the content analysis 
of the answers to the open-ended question (n = 42) regarding the Oiva system 
identified concerns related to injustice and necessity of the system as the main 
themes.  The perceptions of injustice were revealed in the responses worrying 
about inspections focusing on irrelevant issues (n = 13), varying 
interpretations and even the arbitrariness of officials (n = 8), and the lowest 
grade of all areas inspected determining the overall grade of the whole 
inspection (n = 7). Additionally, the necessity of the Oiva system or its 
suitability in the food industry was questioned in eight responses, and six 
respondents doubted consumer understanding of inspection reports. The 
perception of the Oiva system increasing the costs of official food control was 
discussed in five responses. In two optimistic responses, however, the Oiva 
system and common guinelines were seen as an opportunity to harmonize 
official control. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 RISK-BASIS OF ENFORCEMENT 
Based on the results of this thesis, official food control has an important role 
in detecting food safety violations and encouraging FBOs to correct them. 
Severe or multiple non-compliances were reported in the enforcement 
decisions and graded as jeopardizing food safety in the Oiva inspection 
reports, although the current food safety legislation builds on the principle 
that FBOs are responsible for the safety of their operations and foodstuffs and 
have in-house control systems in place to ensure compliance (EU, 2004a).  
Studies I-III indicate that local food control officials have an advisory 
attitude and enforcement measures are mainly used only when other actions 
have proved insufficient. This is supported by the findings that the FBO had 
been requested to correct the detected violations before using enforcement 
measures in most enforcement cases in Studies I and III. Moreover, the most 
commonly used enforcement measure was an order, which is juridically the 
mildest measure, whereas a stronger measure, prohibition, was mainly used 
with critical violations. The importance of negotiation and attempts to 
encourage compliance through softer measures also emerged in the responses 
of the officials in Studies II and III. These findings are in accordance with the 
principles of risk-basis, proportionality and progression of enforcement (EU, 
2004d; OECD, 2014) and in line with findings of other studies reporting that 
officials primarily aim at advising the operators before applying stricter 
enforcement actions (Campbell et al., 2011).  
Enforcement measures were used mostly in cases with multiple, repeated 
or critical food safety violations, indicating that the reasons for using 
enforcement measures are well justified. Many of the violations underlying 
enforcement measures or graded as D in the Oiva system, such as improper 
temperature control, insufficient prevention of cross-contamination or 
unhygienic working practices, are considered critical for food safety and 
prevention of foodborne outbreaks (Todd et al., 2007; Gormley et al., 2011; US 
FDA, 2013; EFSA & ECDC, 2016). Further, a more rapid progression to stricter 
control measures, a lower number of preceding requests to correct the 
violations and conducting the enforcement process more rapidly in critical 
than non-critical violations in Study I reflect a risk-based approach to 
enforcement. Assessing the food safety risk caused by the non-compliance was 
also stressed among the interviewed officials in deciding whether or not to 
initiate an enforcement process. Although not always reported as directly 
contributing to foodborne outbreaks, the most commonly reported non-
compliances in the enforcement decisions in Study I – infrastructure of the 
premises, traceability of foodstuff, self-checking system or other non-
compliance such as improper or misleading labelling – may endanger food 
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safety. Insufficient or faulty labelling may lead to serious health hazards in 
case of missing allergen information (Gowland & Walker, 2015), and deficient 
traceability can endanger tracing back of the foodstuff in, for instance, 
foodborne outbreak investigations (Lundén, 2013). Proper infrastructure and 
suitability of the premises build a basis for arranging operations in a hygienic 
way and preventing cross-contamination in the operations. Further, a food 
safety management system suited for the operations of food premises is 
essential for assessing critical control points in the operations, establishing 
jointly adopted working practices and orientating new employees. However, 
the significance of these food safety issues may not be obvious to all FBOs or 
their correction may be prohibitively expensive or require major changes in 
the operations, possibly explaining why FBOs fail to conduct the corrective 
actions and intervention by food control officials by using enforcement 
measures is needed. Financial constraints and a lack of food safety knowledge 
or understanding of the legislation are widely reported challenges of FBOs to 
comply with or implement food safety systems (Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Baş et 
al., 2007; Mensah & Julien, 2011; Nevas et al., 2013).  
The responses of FBOs in dairy, fishery and meat establishments in Study 
IV suggest that they appreciate official food control and consider it to be 
important for the food safety of their establishment. Moreover, the high school 
grades given for official food control indicate a general satisfaction of FBOs 
with its quality. The time limits set by the food control official for correction of 
non-compliances and ensuring that they were corrected also demonstrate the 
necessity and efficacy of controls. The results are in line with previous studies 
reporting high appreciation of official food control and its importance among 
Finnish FBOs (Nevas et al. 2013; Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b). 
Although the perceptions by FBOs of official food control were generally 
positive, rather critical opinions of the relevance of the requirements and the 
risk-basis of local food control and the Oiva system were observed. Only 57% 
of the responding FBOs considered official food control to be risk-based, and 
the open answers implied that rather many FBOs wished that the size, type of 
production and nature of the operations of the establishment would be taken 
more into account in the control. The dissatisfaction with control was also 
indicated in the concerns of FBOs regarding the Oiva inspections focusing on 
irrelevant issues and half of the FBOs reporting that the optimal inspection 
frequency of their establishment would be less than the current frequency. 
Arguably, the extensive and detailed requirements set for approved 
establishments promote critique of official control. FBOs may also not 
understand the influence of the compliance history on risk assessment, as the 
majority believed that the control history of a FBO should not affect the control 
action taken, with the control actions being similar in all cases. It is also 
possible that the Oiva system in the approved establishments having just 
recently begun before conducting the survey explains the more guarded 
perceptions and concerns of FBOs regarding the risk-basis and justness of 
official food control in general. To promote the trust of FBOs on the risk-basis 
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of control, particular attention should be paid to explaining and justifying the 
inspection frequencies to the FBOs. Explicit communication and adequate 
reasoning of control actions and requirements also helps the FBOs to 
understand the relevance of the non-compliances and required actions (Nevas 
et al., 2013; Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b).  
A risk-based approach in enforcement is further emphasized both in the 
new EU regulation on official controls (EU, 2017) and in the national 
guidelines (Evira, 2017b), further enhancing the risk-based characterization of 
FBOs and their inspection frequencies. For instance, taking into account the 
existence and level of private quality systems and the results of audits in the 
determination of the frequency of official control has been incorporated in the 
new EU regulation on official controls (EU, 2017) and discussed during the 
preparatory work of reforming the Finnish Food Act (Haikonen & Miettinen, 
2018). However, despite reported overlap between official inspections and 
private audits, a recent Finnish study indicates major differences in the 
findings made during official controls and private audits (Turku et al., 2018). 
For instance, non-compliances related to crucial food safety components, such 
as sanitation, prevention of cross-contamination and sampling, have been 
significantly more frequently detected during official inspections than during 
private audits (Turku et al., 2018), thus raising questions about the 
comparability of these two inspection modes. 
 
6.2 EFFICACY OF ENFORCEMENT  
More than 40% of the responding officials in Study II perceived that 
enforcement measures are not always used in their unit when needed to assure 
food safety, indicating that the control is not always as efficacious as it should 
be. Moreover, FBOs having a history of non-compliance for several years and 
unsuccessful preceding requests to correct recurrent non-compliances before 
initiating an enforcement process in Studies I and III indicate that the advisory 
control measures are not always efficacious enough and enforcement 
measures have not in all cases been used as rapidly as they should have been. 
In some cases, enforcement measures were not used even though the FBO was 
given the poorest inspection grade repeatedly due to the same non-
compliances. Not using enforcement measures when needed may set FBOs in 
an unequal position and, in the worst case, jeopardize food safety. 
When used, enforcement measures appear to induce compliance and the 
officials consider them necessary control methods. In Study III, even a threat 
of enforcement measures and hearing the argumentation of the prospective 
enforcement decision accelerated the correction of violations in nearly half of 
the enforcement cases.  Therefore, instead of recurrent inspections with poor 
results, smooth and rapid initiation of an enforcement process would be 
preferable and increase the efficacy of controls. However, the long durations 
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of pre-enforcement and enforcement processes and the recurrent need to use 
enforcement measures decrease the efficacy of enforcement. Also a notable 
number of the officials seem to be dissatisfied with the efficacy of using 
enforcement measures, perceiving them as laborious and slow. The long 
durations of the processes are partly explained by the required administrative 
stages of the procedure, but may also reflect uncertainty, insufficient guidance 
and unclear practices in the units.  
The measures having a direct economic impact on the FBO appear to be 
efficacious. Each case in which a threat of penalty payment or a suspension of 
operations was imposed in Study I resulted in compliance. However, the 
enforcement processes in these cases took a long time, during which the 
violations persisted, thus decreasing the usability of the measures and the 
efficacy of the procedure. Imposing a penalty payment or a threat of 
suspension is a rather laborious process with several administrative steps that 
take time and resources. The slowness of the procedure probably explains why 
almost 60% of the responding food control officials in Study II agreed that a 
fine imposed by the head of the unit should be incorporated into enforcement 
measures. However, barely 40% agreed that the inspecting officials should 
have the right to impose on-site fines, indicating that the fining issue divides 
opinions of food control officials and would be a major change in the Finnish 
food control culture. For instance, in Denmark, an administrative fine can be 
imposed in response to non-compliance detected during an inspection (DVFA, 
2015), and the possibility to issue on-site fines to FBOs has been discussed as 
an option to enhance the efficacy of control actions also in Finland (Lepistö, 
2008). Recently, incorporating an administrative fine into the available 
enforcement measures has been discussed as a part of reforming the Finnish 
Food Act (Haikonen & Riipinen, 2017). Considering the observed 
inconsistencies in the current use of enforcement measures, ensuring the legal 
protection of FBOs would arguably be among the foremost challenges in 
imposition of fines in food control. The possibilities to simplify and quicken 
the enforcement process, without compromising the legal protection of FBOs, 
should be further investigated. Moreover, independent of the administrative 
enforcement procedure, a lower threshold of food control authorities in 
reporting severe food safety violations to the police could improve the 
deterrent aspect of official food control (Lepistö & Hänninen, 2011).  
The need for more stringent rules and enforcement methods for non-
compliant or fraudulent FBOs has been identified also at the EU level. The new 
Official Controls Regulation (EU) No 2017/625, becoming gradually 
applicable but in full in December 2019, amends several previous regulations 
and repeals Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 
(EU, 2017). The new regulation further stresses a risk-based approach in 
control, extends the list of enforcement actions and reinforces the rules on 
financial penalties for fraudulent practices (EU, 2017).  
Among the responding FBOs (IV), rather critical opinions of the necessity 
and efficacy of control actions in practice emerged. These findings somewhat 
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differ from those of a study on restaurant business operators, the majority of 
which perceived the control measures taken in their restaurants as needed, 
effective and preventative of future non-compliance (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 
2014b). Also in a study on FBOs in approved establishments conducted in 
2006, nearly 90% of the FBOs believed that the actions taken by the food 
control official had enhanced hygiene in their establishment (Nevas et al., 
2013). Thereafter, food legislation has developed in an increasingly co-
regulatory direction, placing more and more responsibility on the FBOs and 
their in-house control systems. In this study, FBOs assessed the hygiene level 
of their establishments as very high, which may explain why the actions taken 
by the control official might not be considered necessary or as having much 
effect on the operations. However, given the rather low response rates of the 
FBOs, it is possible that the respondents represent a particularly critical group 
of FBOs and the results may not be fully generalized. Moreover, the 
perceptions of FBOs of the food safety level of their establishments and the 
need for corrective actions may differ from that of the food control official; 
several studies have reported deficiencies in the food safety expertise of the 
FBOs or in their skills in evaluating the food safety risks in their operations 
(Clayton et al. 2002; Walker et al. 2003a; Baş et al. 2006; Jianu & Chiş 2012; 
Karaman, 2012; Nevas et al. 2013).  
Interestingly, while most responding FBOs considered official food control 
to be important for the economic success of their company, the benefits of 
official food control were seen as minor relative to the costs. Presumably, most 
FBOs appreciate the role of official control in, for instance, preventing 
distorted competition between compliant and non-compliant FBOs. On the 
other hand, the concrete expenses of official controls, such as inspection fees 
and the costs of correction of certain non-compliances due to requirements by 
control officials, may cause dissatisfaction among FBOs. In addition, as rather 
few FBOs found the Oiva grades to be important for their business 
transactions, it may be that official control results are not perceived to be as 
valuable for business as, for instance, private certificates, thus affecting FBOs’ 
perceptions of the cost/benefit ratio of official control.   
 
6.3 CONSISTENCY OF ENFORCEMENT 
Variation in the use of enforcement measures was observed between the units 
as well as among the officials (I-III). Perhaps the units and officials who have 
used enforcement measures only rarely or not at all have had no need to use 
such measures. However, it appears that the variation also arises from 
differing practices and prioritization of control methods. Based on the results 
of Studies II and III, a lack of routine, uncertainty and unclear practices and 
alignments in the units hinder the use of enforcement measures and weaken 
the consistency of control. The low number of respondents from non-enforcer 
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units in Study II limits the comparison of the units, but possibly also leads to 
an underestimation of the differences between units and the difficulties 
related to using enforcement measures.  
Reluctance to issue a grade D to avoid later use of enforcement measures, 
as stated by a few interviewed officials (III), may not only set FBOs in unequal 
positions but also compromise food safety. Variation in assessment of non-
compliances and a narrow use of the grading scale may also weaken the 
transparency and relevance of information provided in disclosure of the 
inspection results (Ho, 2012). Varying interpretations by the local food control 
officials regarding an adequate level of compliance and the needed control 
actions (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015) and defective adoption of and commitment 
to joint practices in the units (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2016) have been earlier 
reported in Finnish local food control. Also in other regulatory areas, such as 
occupational safety and health, factors related to the experience of the officials 
and insufficient instructions have been identified as hindering the efficacy and 
consistency of enforcement (Niskanen, 2015).  
Only about one-third of the responding FBOs in Study IV considered 
official food control to be uniform, and one-fifth reported that it was arbitrary, 
demonstrating strong dissatisfaction with the consistency and fairness of 
official food control. Differing interpretations between officials and excessive 
power of a single food control official in grading were particularly noted by 
FBOs in the comments related to the Oiva system. The findings of varying 
enforcement practices and opinions of FBOs of differing requirements among 
control units and inspectors are in line with previous studies reporting 
inconsistencies in enforcement between food control authorities (Hutter & 
Amodu, 2009; Mascini & Wijk, 2009; Ho, 2012; Lee-Woolf et al., 2015; 
Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015). The perceptions of inequity and injustice in the 
grading may also indicate FBOs’ distrust of food control authorities. 
Traditionally, Finnish citizens have had at least a moderate trust in public 
sector institutions and organizations, but the realization of the principles of 
good governance, e.g. guidance given by the public authorities and clarity and 
understandability of administrative decisions, has garnered less satisfaction 
among citizens (Salminen & Ikola?Norrbacka, 2010). Among FBOs, a lack of 
trust in food control officials has been noted to hamper their compliance with 
food safety regulations (Yapp & Fairman, 2006).  
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6.4 IMPROVING THE BASIS FOR EFFICACIOUS AND 
CONSISTENT ENFORCEMENT  
 DEVELOPING PRACTICAL TOOLS AND EXPERTISE IN THE 
UNITS 
The results of Studies II and III highlight the importance of practical 
prerequisites such as guidelines for the enforcement process, templates for 
decisions and jointly discussed alignments in facilitating the initiation of an 
enforcement process and increasing the consistency of practices. Also previous 
studies have recognized the benefits of checklists and pre forma templates for 
inspection reports in increasing the efficacy and consistency of controls 
(Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015) and the importance of proper orientation of the 
personnel in committing the personnel to joint practices (Läikkö-Roto et al., 
2016). However, templates for urgent enforcement decisions, enabling 
immediate on-site initiation of an enforcement process, were available in less 
than half of enforcer units. Further development of simple templates for 
enforcement decisions could help in increasing the speed and efficacy of the 
enforcement process.  
The size of the unit appears to be associated with the existence of practical 
prerequisites. In Study I, the number of enforcement cases did not correlate 
with the number of food premises in the areas of the units or with the labour 
resources of the units. However, based on the survey in Study II, larger units 
had used enforcement measures more commonly than the smaller ones and 
appeared to have better availability of practical tools for using enforcement 
measures. The prospective reform of organizing official food control in larger 
counties may thus promote certain prerequisites for efficacious enforcement 
such as possibilities of the counties to allocate labour and expertise for 
development of operational procedures and quality systems, opportunities for 
the officials to specialize in certain areas and resources to conduct co-
inspections and develop peer-review systems. Adequate and easily available 
judicial assistance in enforcement procedures is also important, as the 
responding officials indicated the need for lawyers acquainted with food 
legislation in their unit.   
Participation in training related to the use of enforcement measures 
differed significantly among enforcer and non-enforcer inspectors. Much 
effort has been directed to improving the skills of officials by providing new 
guidelines and more training, which have been reported to positively influence 
the use of enforcement measures (COM, 2013). Nevertheless, the responses of 
the officials indicate that the availability of the training provided is inadequate. 
Furthermore, non-enforcer inspectors displayed less certainty in deciding 
when enforcement measures should be used and assessed their knowledge of 
administrative procedures somewhat less positively. As previous studies have 
identified shortcomings in the implementation of administrative procedures 
and fulfilment of good governance among Finnish food control authorities 
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(Lepistö, 2008; Lepistö et al., 2009), further training on the administrative 
procedure, deciding which situations warrant enforcement measures and 
which measures should be applied and formulating and reasoning of the 
enforcement decisions appears to be needed. Targeted and frequent training 
with a practical approach and example cases would not only enhance the 
abilities of officials in using enforcement measures but also help in increasing 
the efficacy of the enforcement procedures and improving consistency of 
practices. Also other authors have reported that public health inspectors have 
expressed the desire for regular training on food safety and possibilities to 
share experiences with other officials (Pham et al., 2012).  
Based on the responses of FBOs in Study IV, expertise of the official is 
valuable in motivating their compliance, as high-quality guidance from the 
official would positively influence the maintenance of the hygiene level of the 
establishment. Earlier studies have reported that officials are an important 
source of information on food hygiene and legislation for FBOs (Nevas et al., 
2013), and satisfaction of the FBOs with the quality of official food control 
promotes their perceptions of its relevance and importance (Läikkö-Roto & 
Nevas, 2014b). Therefore, to guarantee high-quality guidance and support 
provided to FBOs, presumably enhancing the correction of non-compliances 
and improving food safety, regular maintenance and development of the 
expertise of the officials should be ensured. 
The responses of Study II indicate that inspectors are satisfied with the 
expertise of and the support received from the head of their unit. However, 
inspectors of enforcer units assessed the expertise of the head more positively 
than did inspectors of non-enforcer units. These findings suggest that the food 
safety knowledge of the head of the unit and her/his conversance with 
enforcement procedures may promote the capabilities of inspectors in using 
enforcement measures and should therefore be ensured in all units. Also 
management skills of the head of the unit are essential in committing the 
personnel to quality systems and jointly agreed practices and promoting the 
efficacy of control (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2016).  
Despite the identified challenges in the use of enforcement measures, the 
results of Studies I, II and III indicate that certain units have a particularly 
strong expertise and routine in using enforcement measures. Sharing of the 
good practices of these units could benefit the units with less experience in 
using enforcement measures. Moreover, increasing joint discussions on the 
alignments and interpretations of the requirements among the units could 
improve the consistency of enforcement practices. As the national audit 
system appears to have failed in providing the local officials with the practical 
evaluation and guidance needed, cross-audits among the units or including 
local officials in the audit teams has been suggested (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 
2014a).  
 74 
 
 ENHANCING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE OFFICIAL AND 
THE FBO 
Most FBOs perceived that the food control official focuses on relevant subjects 
during the inspections and agreed that they contact a food control official 
when in need of advice on food hygiene issues. Official-FBO interaction 
emerged as an important factor in supporting compliance, as the perceptions 
of FBOs of good co-operation with the official promoted their positive views of 
official food control and its quality, relevance and benefits. Experience of good 
co-operation and high-quality control had also a positive influence on the 
satisfaction of FBOs with the current inspection frequency, highlighting the 
significance of a collaborative approach to improve their perceptions of the 
relevance of official control and inspections. Moreover, a co-operative and 
communicative attitude is widely identified to strengthen common trust 
between officials and regulated parties (May & Wood, 2003; Pautz, 2009, 
2010; Rorie et al., 2015; Meyer et al., 2017) and support compliance (e.g., 
Fairman & Yapp 2005; Green & Kane, 2014; Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 2014b; 
Buckley, 2015). The importance of communication is also demonstrated by 
Davies et al. (2014) who found unsuccessful communication to be associated 
with many experiences by FBOs of inconsistent control. However, despite the 
intentions of officials to communicate in a constructive way and be co-
operative, other authors report that FBOs tend to perceive the behaviour of the 
official as more negative and coercive than intended by the official (Mascini & 
Wijk, 2009). Investing in training on communication and co-operative skills 
of the officials would therefore be beneficial in improving their abilities to 
perform in difficult and even coercive control situations and to promote 
positive attitudes of FBOs towards official control, motivation to comply with 
food regulations and trust in food control authorities. 
Maintaining a good relationship with the FBO appears to be important for 
officials, as many of them were concerned about impaired co-operation as a 
consequence of using enforcement measures. This fear was found to be 
particularly strong among non-enforcer inspectors and may diminish their 
eagerness to use enforcement measures, possibly leading to unequal treatment 
of FBOs and inefficacious enforcement. Clear practices within the unit and 
enforcement measures being an ordinary part of control actions could mitigate 
these concerns. However, a concern about limited understanding of FBOs 
regarding the requirements and enforcement decisions, due to a lack of 
knowledge, poor attitude or cultural and language-related challenges, was also 
stated by some the responding officials. Particularly small-sized FBOs do not 
necessarily have the competence to distinguish the legislative difference 
between administrative decisions and other documents received from 
authorities (Fairman & Yapp, 2005). The difficulties related to language 
barriers between officials and FBOs and the need for provision of food safety 
information in different languages to FBOs have also been previously reported 
(Pham et al., 2010b). 
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 SUPPORTING OPERATING CONDITIONS OF FBOS 
The recurrence of non-compliances in Studies I and III, despite requests and 
enforcement measures applied by the control authorities, indicate that some 
FBOs lack the ability to manage food safety in their operations or have a poor 
attitude towards food hygiene and food safety rules. While the majority of 
Finnish FBOs are compliant and receive good or excellent inspection grades 
(Evira, 2017f), non-compliances and difficulties in managing food safety 
appear to accumulate with certain FBOs. Recurrent or certain food safety 
violations are associated with an increased likelihood of food premises being a 
source of foodborne outbreaks, thus creating a serious public health risk 
(Kassa, 2001; Petran et al., 2012). Detection of FBO-related factors that may 
predispose to recurrent non-compliant behaviour or difficulties in 
understanding food safety requirements, for instance, through a tool assessing 
food safety culture of the company (FSA UK, 2012) could help in risk-based 
targeting of rapid early-stage assistance and efficacious intervention in the 
operations of these FBOs.  
The results of Study IV reveal variation in the opinions of FBOs regarding 
the relevance and uniformity of control in relation to the size of the 
establishment, but not in relation to the establishment’s main type of 
production. The vast majority of the responding establishments were classified 
as SMEs based on their number of employees, and most were micro-sized, 
corresponding to the share of micro-FBOs in the Finnish food industry 
(Hyrylä, 2016). The low number of respondents in the categories limits the 
reliability of the comparison of groups, but small-sized (10-49 employees) 
FBOs appeared to be particularly critical of the relevance, quality and efficacy 
of official food control, compared with all other-sized groups. The strong 
perceptions of arbitrariness by this group of FBOs and their wishes for less 
frequent inspections and more negotiation about the required changes suggest 
that they have certain characteristics that make them perceive official food 
control as less fair or reasonable. Compared with larger FBOs, small FBOs may 
have a limited capacity to implement advanced food safety management 
systems, as a lack of resources, time and food safety expertise are widely 
reported challenges among smaller FBOs (Walker et al., 2003b; Fairman & 
Yapp, 2004; Yapp & Fairman, 2006; Violaris et al., 2008; Wilcock et al., 2011; 
Karaman, 2012). In addition, due to a lack of knowledge of legal requirements, 
particularly smaller FBOs may have a lesser ability to assess their own 
compliance (Fairman & Yapp, 2005). On the other hand, compared with 
micro-sized establishments that have very small-scale food processing, the 
nature and volume of the operations of small establishments may create 
substantially greater risks. Small FBOs may thus bear rather frequent 
inspections and strict interpretation of the requirements, explaining why the 
group of small FBOs appeared to perceive the burden and justness of official 
control pessimistically.  
Among restaurant business operators, the hygiene level in their food 
premises appears to be positively associated with their knowledge of and 
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attitude towards food hygiene and official food control (Läikkö-Roto & Nevas, 
2014b). Sufficient and regular food safety training provided to FBOs and their 
personnel could thus enhance their capability of detecting food safety risks in 
their operations and also enable them to gain the most benefits from 
inspections and the advice given by the food control official. To respond to the 
special needs of SMEs, Evira has recently launched a project to reform the 
public guidance system for small- and medium-sized food businesses (Evira, 
2017a). The project also aims to take the special characteristics of FBOs with 
diverse cultural backgrounds better into account by providing them with 
special support such as translated guidelines on implementation of legislative 
requirements (Evira, 2017a). Moreover, as the competence of the officials to 
communicate with customers from diverse cultural backgrounds is essential 
for effective and equal delivery of services (Rice, 2007), this topic should be 
addressed in vocational education and further training of food control officials. 
A focus of future research should be to determine what FBOs expect from 
official food control and how the perceptions of FBOs regarding the benefits 
of official food control could be improved.  
 ESTABLISHING THE OIVA EVALUATION SYSTEM AND 
STRENGTHENING THE TRUST OF FBOS IN THE SYSTEM 
The Oiva system and the evaluation guidelines appear beneficial in enhancing 
the risk-basis, efficacy and consistency of enforcement. However, as the 
system was in its early stages while Studies II-IV were conducted, its influence 
on the harmonization of control practices could not be comprehensively 
assessed. The findings of this thesis indicate that the guidelines as well as 
publicly announcing inspection results have the potential to speed up the 
enforcement process and correction of violations, although the data do not 
enable direct comparison of control actions employed before and after 
launching of the Oiva system. 
To ensure consistent interpretation and practices, regular education of 
inspecting officials and detailed guidelines have been provided already before 
and since the introduction of the Oiva system. However, unification of the 
practices of many individual control units and inspectors are not simple 
processes and require continuous training and support be provided to the 
officials (Läikkö-Roto, 2016). In improving the consistency of evaluation and 
interpretation, peer-review and co-inspections among the inspecting officials 
are reported to be beneficial and have been recommended for inclusion in the 
standard practices of all food control jurisdictions (Ho, 2017). 
The concerns of FBOs in Study IV regarding the justness of the system and 
its value for the food industry or consumers and their suspicions about the 
ability of the system to improve the consistency and efficacy of official control 
indicate rather low acceptance of the system among FBOs. As consumers 
usually do not directly deal with the approved establishments the same way as 
with retail stores or restaurants, FBOs may not perceive the disclosure of their 
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inspection results as useful. FBOs may also have a fear of the system creating 
negative publicity, indicated by the concerns of unfairness of the 
determination of the overall grade of the inspection based on the poorest grade 
of inspected items. Although the positive effects of disclosing the inspection 
results of retail food premises on consumer information and compliance are 
widely recognized (Jin & Leslie 2003; Simon et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 
2005; Serapiglia et al. 2007; Filion & Powell, 2009; Ho, 2012; Papadopoulos 
et al., 2012; Djekic et al. 2014; Wong et al., 2015; Da Cunha et al. 2016a), no 
evidence yet exists about the influence of the system on food safety among 
FBOs operating before the retail stage. In addition, consumers may have a 
narrow understanding of the safe food handling practices and risks involved 
(Altekruse et al., 1996; Jevšnik et al., 2008a), thus having a limited ability to 
judge the meaning of different inspected items or grades. Consumers may also 
have misconceptions of the information presented in the inspection reports 
(Nielsen, 2006; Jones & Grimm, 2008; Leisner et al. 2014). However, 
considering that a majority of the Oiva grades of the approved establishments 
in 2015 were excellent or good (Evira, 2016a, 2016e), most of the FBOs appear 
to benefit from the system. More research is required to reveal the influence 
of the Oiva system on the operations of FBOs and whether FBOs’ acceptance 
of the system and grading improves through solid establishing of the system. 
In developing the Oiva system further, particular attention should be paid to 
the risk-basis of the evaluation and grading criteria by monitoring the ability 
of the system to enhance the correction of violations and prevent public health 
risks. In addition, as Study III revealed challenges in assessing the use of 
enforcement measures on the basis of the data reported from the units in the 
national database, introducing the new data collection system for 
environmental health and food control (Evira, 2017c) will likely further 
improve the utilization of nationally collected data in developing the Oiva 
system and in evaluating the efficacy of food control actions.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this thesis indicate that official food control has an important 
role in detecting food safety non-compliances, inducing their correction and 
supporting compliance in food premises. Despite the generally risk-based 
approach to enforcement, certain deficiencies in efficacy and consistency of 
enforcement practices were detected.  
 
 
1. Administrative enforcement measures are necessary control methods 
to induce FBOs to correct food safety violations. Enforcement measures 
are mainly used when an FBO has multiple, recurrent or critical non-
compliances and milder control measures have proved ineffective, 
indicating a risk-based and progressive approach to enforcement. The 
risk-basis is indicated also by the finding that the enforcement process 
is initiated more rapidly and the duration of the enforcement process is 
shorter in critical food safety violations than in non-critical ones.  
 
2. The use of administrative enforcement measures leads to correction of 
non-compliances, but repeated requests to correct non-compliances 
before initiating an enforcement process and the long durations of 
enforcement processes decrease the efficacy of enforcement. Food 
control officials perceive the enforcement process as laborious and slow 
and are not fully content with the efficacy of the process. Repeated 
violations also indicate recklessness of some FBOs towards food safety 
requirements and raise the question of the need for more efficacious 
and rapid enforcement methods. A lower threshold for initiating an 
enforcement process and improving the speed and fluency of the 
process could increase the efficacy of enforcement by accelerating the 
correction of violations. 
 
3. The approaches and preparedness to use enforcement measures vary 
among local food control units and among inspecting officials. Some 
units have well-established practices and routines in using enforcement 
measures, while other units apply enforcement measures rather 
infrequently or not at all. Case-dependent and risk-based discretion is 
required to find the most appropriate and efficacious way of intervening 
in non-compliant operations. However, inadequate practical 
prerequisites and unclear alignments in the units create uncertainty in 
using enforcement measures among the officials and decrease the 
efficacy and consistency of enforcement. Learning from the good 
practices of the units with a strong routine in using enforcement 
measures, further training of officials with a practical approach and 
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improving guidance are needed to overcome the hurdles to applying 
enforcement measures and to bolster the confidence of officials in their 
use.  
 
4. FBOs in approved dairy, fishery and meat establishments appear to 
appreciate official food control and its importance for food safety. The 
quality of control is considered to be generally good and official food 
control is seen as having a positive influence on the hygiene level of 
most establishments. However, the consistency of official food control 
is perceived as rather poor, and particularly small-sized FBOs are 
critical of the relevance of the requirements and control actions in 
practice. A perception of good co-operation with the official is 
associated with positive views of FBOs about official food control, thus 
having a positive influence on the efficacy of enforcement and food 
safety.  
 
5. The Oiva system has potential to standardize the use of enforcement 
measures. Improving the consistency of grading and enforcement 
practices is an ongoing process, in which further co-operation and peer-
review between and within units would be beneficial. Among FBOs, the 
Oiva system appears to raise early-stage concerns regarding its 
suitability in approved establishments and the justness of the grading. 
As the system was in its early stages while this work was conducted, 
further research and more experiences with the system are needed 
before determining its influence on the efficacy of enforcement and the 
benefits provided to FBOs. 
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